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Abstract
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This thesis includes three essays. The first chapter analyzes how the implications
of productivity shocks in an open economy can differ depending on the size of the
economy relative to the rest of the world. It employs a stylized two-country general
equilibrium model with love of variety, where economies differ in size and shows that
a dynamic home market effect is present: productivity shocks that lower production
and entry costs lead to deterioration of home terms of trade when home is small
relative to the rest of the word but to improvement of terms of trade when home is
large.
The second chapter analyzes the role of globalization in the lack of convergence of
living standards within Europe, despite integration processes. Building on theoretical
and empirical literature on trade and income inequality in the U.S. this chapter
proposes a model that describes how globalization affects disparities between countries
in Europe. To quantitatively assess this effect, a measure of exposure to globalization
is constructed, using detailed trade, employment, and output data. The chapter
shows that the relative performance of countries within Europe is correlated with their
exposure to globalization. In particular, countries that experienced relative declines
of living standards over the past decade have been most exposed to globalization.
The third chapter explores the implications of demand side pricing complementar-
ities and endogenous markups in open economy. It shows that endogenous markups
resulting from translog preferences imply richer dynamics for international relative
prices that have better chances to match the data. Further, countercyclical markups
lead to endogenous procyclical movement as well as cross-country correlation of mea-
sured TPF. It also shows that in a stylized model endogenous markups may act as
a transmission mechanism, leading in particular to positive GDP comovement across
borders as opposed to a benchmark CES model.
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Chapter 1
Productivity Shocks and Terms of Trade:
The Dynamic Home Market Effect
1.1 Introduction
Understanding how international relative prices are related to productivity and output
growth is a key question in international macroeconomics. A central idea in traditional
trade and growth theory is that the benefits of improvements in domestic productivity
are transmitted to the rest of the world as the country’s terms of trade deteriorate.1
The empirical evidence, however, suggests that in the U.S. terms of trade tend to
improve rather than deteriorate following an increase in productivity.2 In response
to this, a number of papers have introduced various modifications to benchmark
international real business cycle models and shown that varying trade elasticities,
persistence of shocks, degree of capital mobility, and openness to trade can help
models match the data.3 The literature focusing on the extensive margin of trade has
argued that when productivity improvements lead to introduction of new varieties,
1Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) have argued that the association of capital accumulation with
deteriorating terms of trade is an important factor contributing to stable world income distribution.
2Corsetti, Dedola, Leduc (2006, 2008)
3Corsetti, Dedola, Leduc (2008); Enders and Muller (2009)
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the terms of trade would not deteriorate.4 In general, the international empirical
evidence on the relationship between productivity and terms of trade is inconclusive.
Raffo (2010) finds that the correlation between terms of trade and output ranges
from -0.18 to 0.43 in OECD countries. In a panel regression of 20 OECD countries,
Corsetti Martin and Pesenti (2007) find that the relationship between output growth
and relative export prices varies across countries.
In this paper I explore a new factor that can cause different countries to experience
different responses of terms of trade to domestic productivity shocks: namely, the size
of the economy relative to the rest of the world. This approach is motivated by the
empirical regularity documented in the literature that for the U.S. and possibly some
other relatively large economies terms of trade tend to be procyclical, while in smaller
economies they tend to be countercyclical. In particular, in a VAR analysis for G7
countries Corsetti et al (2006) find that productivity shocks, which are identified by
long-term restrictions, tend to improve terms of trade in case of large economies such
as U.S. and Japan but worsen it in case of others.
Table 1.1 presents contemporaneous correlations between terms of trade (the ratio
of export price index to import price index) and total factor productivity in a sample
of industrialized economies. The data are from OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts
database and Haver Analytics. The longest available quarterly time series has been
used for each country, however, the correlations do not appear sensitive to changing
the sample period. The statistics refer to the residual component obtained after
applying HP-filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600 to the natural logarithm
of each series. For the majority of countries the correlation is negative, implying that
improvements in total factor productivity are associated with deteriorations of their
4Corsetti, Martin, Pesenti (2007)
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terms of trade. The exceptions are the U.S. and some countries where commodity
exports play an important role, including Canada, Norway and Brazil.
Table 1.1: Terms of Trade and Total Factor Productivity:
Contemporaneous Correlations
U.S. 0.290 U.K. −0.062
Turkey −0.048 Switzerland −0.303
Sweden −0.156 Spain −0.070
Slovenia −0.155 Slovakia −0.077
Portugal −0.512 Norway 0.141
New Zealand −0.064 Netherlands −0.302
Luxembourg −0.158 Japan 0.073
Italy −0.672 Ireland −0.203
Iceland −0.198 Hungary −0.034
Germany −0.003 France −0.127
Estonia −0.023 Denmark −0.096
Czech Republic −0.493 Canada 0.056
Brazil 0.084 Belgium −0.378
Austria −0.422 Australia −0.162
From the theoretical standpoint the goal of this paper is to extend the well es-
tablished notion of home market effect and explore in what ways economies that are
not symmetric in steady state may respond differently to identical shocks. The home
market effect in its original formulation, as discussed for example in Feenstra (2004)
refers to the idea that when consumers love variety and trade frictions are present,
the larger economy will produce more than proportionately more varieties. I show
3
that there is also a ”dynamic” home market effect, which, in a model with trade fric-
tions and incomplete markets, in particular, makes terms of trade improve following
a positive productivity shock if the economy is relatively large and deteriorate when
the economy is relatively small.
I use a simple general equilibrium two-country model, where the countries differ
in economic (or market) size. This difference can come from assuming an asymmetry
in population size, steady state productivity levels, or other parameters but the exact
assumption is not relevant as long as it results in a difference between the economic
size of countries in the steady state. In this respect this paper differs from most of the
international macro literature that focuses either on small open economy models or
models where the two countries are symmetric, at least in the initial steady state. The
model features monopolistically competitive firms that produce an endogenous num-
ber of varieties. Labor is used both for production and innovation, i.e. introduction
of new varieties and is not mobile across countries. International trade is balanced
and subject to frictions as some varieties are nontradable and there are iceberg trade
costs to exporting.
This paper relates to the literature on international business cycle comovements
that seeks to explain the cyclical behavior of international relative prices. Most closely
it relates to Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007) (CMP, hereafter), who introduce a
model where productivity gains that enhance manufacturing efficiency are distinct
from those that lower the cost of firms’ entry and of product differentiation. They
show that lower manufacturing costs lead to lower terms of trade while lower entry
(innovation) costs lead to improved terms of trade. The CMP model is therefore
capable of explaining the heterogeneous effect of productivity on terms of trade. One
difficulty however arises in that, as the authors acknowledge, productivity improve-
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ments that lead to lower costs of production are probably very highly correlated with
those that lead to lower costs of entry. This means that for the CMP model to ex-
plain why in case of some countries productivity tends to be positively associated with
terms of trade while in case of others the relationship tends to be negative, it would
have to assume that the nature of productivity shocks is systematically different in
different countries. My model is similar to CMP, with the important distinctions that
I do not impose a symmetric steady state and allow productivity improvements to
reduces both the cost of producing and the cost of innovating.
In terms of exploring the economic significance of country size, this paper relates
to Alesina et al.(2005), who focus on the interdependence of country size, openness
and growth. An interesting parallel between this paper and Alesina et al.(2005) is that
they both show how the size of countries influences their economic performance as
long as trade is subject to frictions. In terms of relation to the empirical evidence, this
paper relates to Corsetti et al (2006) who document the cross-country heterogeneity
of the relationship between productivity and terms of trade, as well as Hummels and
Klenow (2005), who document empirically that the extensive margin of trade is more
important for larger economies, which tend to export more varieties and benefit from
stronger terms of trade.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the stylized
model. Section 3 next discusses the properties of the asymmetric steady state. Section
4 analyzes the implications of productivity shocks. Section 5 concludes.
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1.2 A Stylized General Equilibrium Model for Two
Asymmetric Countries
The world consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, that are not necessarily
symmetric in size. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. Home and Foreign
economies are populated by respectively L and L∗ households. Households love variety
and derive utility from consuming goods produced in Home and Foreign as well as
leisure. Households own shares in their own country firms and get their profits as
dividends. Labor is not mobile across countries. N (N∗) firms operate in Home
(Foreign). Firms are monopolistically competitive and each firm produces one variety5
either in traded (serving both Home and Foreign markets) or nontraded (serving only
the domestic market) sectors, using domestic labor. The number of varieties produced
in each country is endogenously determined in the model. There is free entry, but
firms face fixed entry costs, which consist of wages paid for introducing a new variety.
International trade is balanced and subject to iceberg trade costs. Prices are flexible,
which allows to focus only on real variables. Because there are no state variables in
the model, time subscripts can be conveniently omitted.
5This assumption implies that a firm can be thought of as identical to a production line of a
variety as, for example, in Bilbie, Ghironi, Melitz (2012). An increase in N (N∗) corresponds to
both introduction of new varieties and creation of new firms.
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1.2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes the following separable utility function, in-
creasing in the home consumption composite C and decreasing in labor effort ls:
U =
C1−
1
ψ
1− 1
ψ
− ls, (1.1)
where ψ ≥ 0.6
C is a CES aggregator of varieties available to Home consumers: all varieties
produced in Home (N) and a fraction of varieties produced in Foreign (1−φ)N∗. φ is
the fraction of varieties that are non-traded. The expression for for Home consumption
aggregator therefore is:
C = [
∫ N
0
c(h)1−
1
σ dh+
∫ N∗(1−φ)
0
c(f)1−
1
σ df ]
σ
1−σ , (1.2)
where c(h) is consumption of a Home produced variety, c(f) is consumption of a
Foreign produced variety and σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across
varieties. A similar expression holds for the Foreign consumption aggregator.
Domestic households own the domestic firms. They finance the fixed costs of
introducing new varieties and in return receive all the profits earned by the firms. In
addition, they earn wages W on labor supplied to the domestic firms. The budget
constraint of a representative household therefore is:
∫ N
0
p(h)c(h)dh+
∫ N∗(1−φ)
0
p(f)c(f)df + I = lsW + Π, (1.3)
6This formulation assumes constant marginal disutility of labor, corresponding to an infinite
Frisch elasticity of labor.
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where p(h) is the price of a Home-produced variety and p(f) is the the price of
a Foreign-produced variety. I is the representative household’s share of the cost of
introducing new varieties, which can be thought of as ”investment”, while Π represents
the equal share of profits that each household receives.
Dividing the household budget constraint by the Home consumption price index,
it can be written in real terms:
∫ N
0
ρ(h)c(h)dh+
∫ N∗(1−φ)
0
ρ(f)c(f)df + i = lsw + pi, (1.4)
where: ρ(h) = p(h)/P , ρ(f) = p(f)/P , w = W/P , i = I/P , and pi = Π/P .
1.2.2 Firms
N firms operate in Home, each producing a different variety. A fraction φ of all
firms specializes in a nontraded variety, while (1− φ) specializes in a traded variety.
Strategic interaction between firms does not arise due to the assumption that the
number of firms operating at any given time is large. Production uses only domestic
labor and aggregate labor productivity z is common for firms in traded and nontraded
sectors. z represents effectiveness of one unit of labor at production. The production
function of a representative firm specializing in the nontraded sector is:
yN = zlNd, (1.5)
and the production function of a representative firm specializing in the traded sector
is:
yT = zlTd, (1.6)
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where lNd (lTd) is the nontraded (traded) firm’s labor demand for production pur-
poses.
To start the production of a variety a firm needs to bear a fixed cost of fN units
of labor in case of a nontraded variety and fT in case of a traded variety. The fixed
costs in the two sectors respectively are:
νN = fnw, (1.7)
νT = fTw. (1.8)
Optimizing firms set prices at a markup over marginal cost. Prices for varieties
consumed in Home therefore are:
p(h) = µ
W
z
, (1.9)
where W is the nominal wage and µ = σ/(σ − 1) is the standard markup for a CES
utility function.
In real terms, dividing both sides by the consumption price index P , equation
(1.9) can be written as:
ρ(h) = µ
w
z
, (1.10)
where w = W/P is the real wage.
Prices of Home produced varieties consumed in Foreign are:
εp(h)∗ = µ
W
z
(1 + τ), (1.11)
where ε is the nominal exchange rate (units of Home currency per units of Foreign)
9
and τ ≥ 0 is the iceberg trade cost parameter.
Dividing both sides by the Foreign price index P ∗, the real price of Home varieties
consumed in Foreign is:
ρ(h)∗ = µ
w
z
(1 + τ), (1.12)
where  is the real exchange rate:  = εP ∗/P , representing the relative price of a
Foreign consumption basket in terms of Home.
In a similar fashion, the real price of Foreign produced varieties consumed in
Foreign is:
ρ(f)∗ = µ
w∗
z∗
, (1.13)
and the real price of Foreign produced varieties consumed in Home is:
ρ(f) = µ
w∗
z∗
(1 + τ). (1.14)
Firms operating in the nontraded sector serve only the local market, therefore the
market clearing condition for a representative Home nontraded variety is.
yN = Lc(h), (1.15)
where L is the population size of Home.
Firms operating in the traded sector serve both local and export markets, implying
the following market clearing condition for a Home produced traded variety:
yT = Lc(h) + (1 + τ)c∗(h)L∗, (1.16)
where L∗ is the population size of Foreign. The presence of the iceberg cost parameter
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in the equation indicates that in order to supply Foreign consumers with one unit of
its output, the Home firm needs to ship (1 + τ) units to Foreign.
Operating profits of a representative Home firm equal total sales minus total
production costs. Real profits for a nontraded variety are given by the following
expression:
dN = (µ− 1)w
z
Lc(h). (1.17)
Real profits of a firms operating in the traded sector on the other hand are given
by:
dT = (µ− 1)w
z
Lc(h) + (µ− 1)w
z
L∗c∗(h)(1 + τ). (1.18)
Similar expressions hold for Foreign.
Equations (1.15)-(1.18) show that firms operating in the traded sector are larger
and more profitable, since in this model profits are proportionate to sales.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
The first-order conditions of Household optimization give the following expressions
for consumption and labor effort in terms of real wages:
C = wψ, (1.19)
ls = wψ−1. (1.20)
Consumption by a Home household of a Home-produced variety is given by:
c(h) = ρ(h)−σC, (1.21)
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and consumption of a Foreign-produced variety is given by:
c(f) = ρ(f)−σC. (1.22)
With CES preferences, the Home price index is given by:
P = [
∫ N
0
p(h)1−σdh+
∫ N∗(1−φ)
0
p(f)1−σdf ]
1
1−σ . (1.23)
In equilibrium with free entry optimal investment into new varieties implies that
entry costs must equal operating profits. Since households own equal shares in all
firms and the distribution of firms across tradable vs. nontradable sectors is given
exogenously, it is useful to define average entry costs and profits over all traded and
nontraded varieties respectively.
ν = φνN + (1− φ)νT , (1.24)
d = φdN + (1− φ)dT . (1.25)
In similar fashion, average firm size is:
y = φyN + (1− φ)yT . (1.26)
Defining in turn f = φfN + (1 − φ)fT , the zero profit condition for Home firms
becomes:
d = fw. (1.27)
Combining equations for profits (1.17) and (1.18) and substituting for equations
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for demand (1.15) and (1.16) average profits can be written as:
d = (µ− 1)w
z
y, (1.28)
which, combined with (1.27) gives the following expression for the size of average
firm:
y =
fz
µ− 1 . (1.29)
Using equations (1.17) and (1.18) and substituting for demand for Home-produced
varieties by Home (equations (1.21) and by Foreign consumers (Foreign counterpart
of equation (1.22)), the zero profit condition for Home firms can be written as:
fz
µ− 1 = L(µ
w
z
)−σwψ + L∗(1− φ)(1 + τ)1−σ(µw
z
)−σw∗ψ, (1.30)
where the expression for consumption (1.19) has also been used.
Similarly, the zero profit condition for Foreign firms is:
f ∗z∗
µ− 1 = L
∗(µ
w∗
z∗
)−σw∗ψ + L(1− φ)(1 + τ)1−σ(µw
∗
z∗
)−σwψ. (1.31)
Since trade is balanced, Home imports have to equal Home exports:
c(f)ρ(f)N∗L = c∗(h)ρ∗(h)NL∗, (1.32)
which, using equations for real prices (1.12) and (1.14), the demand equation (1.22)
and its foreign counterpart, as well as equation (1.19) and its Foreign counterpart,
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can be rewritten as:
N∗L(µ
w∗
z∗
)1−σwψ = NL∗(µ
w
z
)1−σw∗ψ. (1.33)
Finally, labor market clearing conditions requiring that labor supplied in each
country be demanded either for production or for innovation, close the model.7 For
Home, the labor market clearing condition is:
Lls =
y
z
N + fN, (1.34)
which, using equations (1.29) and (1.20) can be written as:
N = wψ−1
L
f
µ− 1
µ
. (1.35)
Similarly, the labor market clearing condition for Foreign is:
N∗ = w∗ψ−1
L∗
f ∗
µ− 1
µ
. (1.36)
Equilibrium then is described by the zero-profit conditions for Home and Foreign,
(equations (1.30) and (1.31)), the balance trade condition (1.33) and labor market
clearing conditions (1.35) and (1.36) for Home and Foreign respectively. The en-
dogenous variables of the model are N,N∗, w, w∗,  and the exogenous shocks are
z, z∗, f, f ∗.
Finally, terms of trade in this model is defined as the ratio of Home export price
7The nontradable goods market clearing condition is redundant.
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to Home import price.
TOT =
ρ(h)∗
ρ(f)
. (1.37)
Using the pricing equations (1.12) and (1.14), TOT can be rewritten as:
TOT =
w/z
w∗/z∗
, (1.38)
which shows that since trade costs and markups are symmetric across countries, terms
of trade is equivalent to the inverse of ”terms of labor”.
1.3 The Steady State
In this section I solve for the steady state where productivity, including both the
efficiency of production as well as the cost of introducing new varieties, is at its
steady state value. The key difference of this model from other two-country models
in the literature is that I am not imposing symmetry in the steady state. It should
be noted that the source of asymmetry is not important. I assume that Home and
Foreign economies differ in population size, however similar results could be obtained
by assuming, for example, that they differ in steady state level of productivity, or
any other assumption that would result in the market size in the two countries being
asymmetric.
I assume that L 6= L∗ and this is the only source of asymmetry of the economies
in steady state. In particular, I assume that L/L∗(0, 1), i.e. the largest Home can
be is as large as the rest of the world (as is realistic) and the smallest it can be is as
small as a small open economy. Further, to remove ”scale effects” I assume that the
size of the world i.e. L+ L∗ is fixed.
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Output of an average firm (the weighted average of traded and nontraded sectors
as explained in equation (1.26) is fixed in steady state and is the same in Home and
Foreign:
yss = y∗ss =
f sszss
µ− 1 = f
sszss(σ − 1), (1.39)
as given by equation (1.29).
The extensive margin on the other hand is affected by the asymmetry. The model
features the traditional home market effect in that the larger economy produces more
varieties. When there are no trade costs and all goods are traded, the ratio of Home-
to-Foreign-produced varieties equals the relative size of Home to Foreign, however in
the presence of trade costs the larger economy will produce more than proportionally
more varieties in steady state.
The larger economy will also have higher wages in steady state. This is because
while labor demand for production does not depend on the size of the economy, labor
demand for setting up new firms does. Households in the larger economy consume
and work more in the steady state. Even though output of a representative firm is
not dependent on the size of the economy, what becomes important is the portion of
output consumed domestically versus the portion that is exported: (y = yd + yx). In
steady state output consumed domestically is:
ydss = L(
σ − 1
σ
)σzσssw
φ−σ
ss , (1.40)
and as long as σ > ψ domestic consumption of Home-produced varieties is smaller
when the economy is smaller. In other words, consistent with empirical evidence
documented for example in Alesina et al. (2005), smaller economies tend to be more
open.
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The expression for real exchange rate in steady state is:
ss = (
NssL
∗
N∗ssL
)
σ
(2σ−1)(ψ−1) , (1.41)
and for terms of trade it is:
TOTss = (
NssL
∗
N∗ssL
)
σ−1
(2σ−1)(ψ−1) . (1.42)
In a symmetric steady state both ss = 1 and TOTss = 1. This also holds when
L 6= L∗ but there are no trade costs as in this case the steady state number of varieties
is proportional to the country size. However, in the presence of trade costs when
L < L∗ then ss < 1 and TOTss < 1 as long as ψ > 1. These results are consistent
with empirical evidence known as the ”Penn effect” or the purchasing power parity
puzzle as in Rogoff (1996).
1.4 Responses to Productivity Shocks
In this section I explore the model responses to productivity shocks and how these
responses differ depending on the relative size of Home versus Foreign countries. For
this goal I log-linearize the model around the steady state assuming a shock to Home
productivity, affecting efficiency of production and entry cost zˆ > 0, fˆ < 0 and no
shocks to Foreign: zˆ∗ = fˆ ∗ = 0. The important aspect of the log-linear solution (the
full solution is described in Appendix A) is that the coefficients are functions of the
relative size of the two economies in steady-state.
As is evident from equation (1.29) the response of average Home firm size (or
scale of production) is generally ambiguous: yˆ = zˆ + fˆ . It depends on whether
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improvements in productivity result more in reduction of production costs or of costs
to innovation. The Foreign firm size is unaffected. Note that, the response of firm
size is independent of the asymmetry.
Home productivity improvement results in higher wages at Home as it increases
the demand for labor both for production and innovation. While wage increase in
unambiguous, exactly how much wages increase depends on the value of ψ. As long
as ψ > 1 labor supply also increases, but not enough to lead to decline of wages. If
ψ < 1 then because of a strong wealth effect, labor supply decreases, leading to even
larger increase of wages.
The response of wages to productivity depends on the steady state asymmetry.
In particular if we express the solution as wˆ = γz zˆ + γf fˆ , then γz > 0 and γf < 0 for
all parameter values but ∂γz/∂(L/L
∗) > 0 and |∂γf/∂(L/L∗)| > 0, i.e. the impact of
shocks is magnified when Home is large. The intuition is that the positive impact of
Home productivity improvements on Foreign depends positively on the size of Home.
In turn this translates into higher Foreign demand for home goods, magnifying the
response of Home variables. When the size of Home approaches zero (as in the small
open economy model) the impact on Foreign variables also approaches zero.
As a result of Home productivity improvement the number of varieties produced in
Home increases for two reasons: lower cost of introduction of new varieties and higher
demand from both Home and Foreign, provided that ψ > 1. Higher demand results
from the fact that consumption increases more than proportionately with income as
long as ψ > 1. On the other hand, when ψ < 1, the demand effect is negative and
the impact on the number of produced varieties may decrease if the impact of lower
entry costs is not large enough. As is expected, the response of varieties again is less
pronounced when Home is small.
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The log-linear equation for real exchange rate is:
ˆ =
σ
2σ − 1(wˆ − wˆ
∗)− σ − 1
2σ − 1 zˆ +
1
2σ − 1 fˆ , (1.43)
and for terms of trade it is:
ˆTOT =
σ − 1
2σ − 1(wˆ − wˆ
∗)− σ
2σ − 1 zˆ −
1
2σ − 1 fˆ (1.44)
The response of the terms of trade is generally ambiguous. As can be seen from
equation (1.44), the ambiguity, can come from two sources: (i) the nature of the pro-
ductivity shock, i.e. to what extent the productivity improvements lead to reduction
of production costs zˆ versus reduction of costs of innovation −fˆ and (ii) the impact
of the productivity shock on the log wage differential wˆ − wˆ∗. The first one, i.e. the
difference between productivity shocks enhancing the efficiency of production and
productivity shocks lowering costs of entry and their impact on international relative
prices is the subject of Corsetti et al.(2007). Instead I focus on the second source
of ambiguity, i.e. the log wage differential and how it systematically depends on the
relative size of Home compared to Foreign.
It is useful to rewrite the terms of trade equation as:
ˆTOT =
σ − 1
2σ − 1(wˆ − wˆ
∗ − zˆ)− 1
2σ − 1(fˆ + zˆ), (1.45)
and consider the special case when efficiency in production and in innovation are
perfectly correlated zˆ = −fˆ . In that case TOT will increase as long as the Home to
Foreign wage differential is larger than the productivity shock.
The dependence of the log wage differential on the relative country size is the
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”dynamic home market effect”. It can be written as:
wˆ − wˆ∗ = Γ1zˆ − Γ2fˆ , (1.46)
where, as shown in Appendix A, both of the coefficients Γ1 and Γ2 are functions of
(yd + yd∗), i.e. the sum of steady state Home demand for Home-produced goods and
Foreign demand for Foreign produced goods, which can be called world domestic de-
mand. It is straightforward to verify that ∂Γ1/∂(y
d + yd∗) > 0 and ∂Γ2/∂(yd + yd∗) >
0 as long as σ > φ.
When there are no trade costs and all goods are traded, world domestic demand
(yd + yd∗) does not depend on the relative sizes of Home and Foreign. This is not
surprising as the conventional home market effect occurs only when there are trade
frictions. However, in the presence of trade frictions, the larger the asymmetry, the
smaller world domestic demand will be. This means that as long as there are trade
frictions, there will be a dynamic home market effect in the sense that following a
positive Home productivity shock the Home to Foreign wage differential will increase
by more if Home is a larger economy (accounting for up to half of the world) and
by less if it is small relative to Foreign. Further, the dynamic home market effect
suggests that following a positive Home productivity shock terms of trade are more
likely to improve if Home is large relative to the rest of the world and more likely to
deteriorate when Home is small relative to the rest of the world.
Figures 1.1-1.3 illustrate the responses to a positive Home productivity shock and
their dependence on the relative size of Home versus Foreign. A positive shock to
productivity is assumed to make it easier to produce existing varieties (Figure 1.1),
to introduce new ones (Figure 1.2), or both (Figure 1.3). The horizontal axis is the
share of Home size L in the world economy, which is normalized to L+ L∗ = 2. The
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solid lines show results with trade frictions, assuming that 50 percent of all varieties
are nontraded (φ = 0.5) and there are iceberg trade costs (τ = 0.2). Dashed lines
show results with no trade frictions. The parameter ψ is calibrated at 1.2 and the
elasticity of substitution across varieties is calibrated at σ = 3.8.8
As shown in Figure 1.3, when productivity of both production and innovation
increase, the response of the terms of trade is positive when Home is large and grad-
ually declines and becomes negative when Home is small. The bottom charts show
the responses of welfare as measured by utility in the two countries, which show that
welfare responses both in Home and Foreign depend negatively on the asymmetry.
The welfare log differential (Uˆ − Uˆ∗) also depends negatively on the share of Home
in the world, implying that relatively small economies share the benefits of their
productivity improvement with the rest of the world mode than large economies do.
1.5 Conclusion
While the open economy macro literature mostly uses either small open economy
models or models where the two countries are symmetric in steady state, the question
of interest for this paper is precisely what happens in between these two extremes and
how such asymmetry can affect the way economies react to shocks. I find that in a
model with trade frictions there is a dynamic home market effect: the responses of key
macroeconomic variables to Home productivity improvements depend on how large
Home is relative to the rest of the world. In particular terms of trade improve following
a positive productivity shock if Home is relatively large and deteriorate, when it is
relatively small. These results can help explain the empirical regularity documented
8This calibration follows the one in Corsetti et al. (2007).
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in the literature that for the U.S. productivity growth tends to be associated with
improvement in the terms of trade while in most other economies it tends to be
associated with deterioration of the terms of trade.
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Figure 1.1: Responses to Home Productivity z-Shock
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Figure 1.2: Responses to Home Productivity f-Shock
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Figure 1.3: Responses to Home Productivity Combined Shock
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Appendix A
The Log-Linear Solution of the Model
The log-liner system is:
Nˆ = (ψ − 1)wˆ − fˆ , (A.1)
Nˆ∗ = (ψ − 1)wˆ∗, (A.2)
((ψ−σ)yd−σ(1−φ)yx)wˆ+ (ψ(1−φ)yx)wˆ∗+σ(1−φ)yxˆ = ((1−σ)y)zˆ+ yfˆ , (A.3)
((ψ − σ)yd∗ − σ(1− φ)yx∗)wˆ∗ + (ψ(1− φ)yx∗)wˆ − σ(1− φ)yx∗ ˆ = 0, (A.4)
Nˆ∗ − Nˆ + (ψ − 1 + σ)wˆ − (ψ − 1 + σ)wˆ∗ − (2σ − 1)ˆ = (σ − 1)zˆ, (A.5)
where yd (yd∗) is Home (Foreign) demand for a Home (Foreign) produced variety and
yx (yx∗) is Home (Foreign) exports of a Home (Foreign) produced variety. The system
can be simplified into two equations in two endogenous variables wˆ and wˆ∗:
Λ1zˆ + Λ2fˆ = Λ3wˆ + Λ4wˆ∗, (A.6)
Λ5zˆ + Λ6fˆ = Λ7wˆ + Λ8wˆ∗, (A.7)
where:
Λ1 = − σ − 1
2σ − 1(f(σ − 1)
2 + σyd), (A.8)
Λ2 =
1
2σ − 1(f(σ − 1)
2 + σyd), (A.9)
26
Λ3 = y
d(ψ − σ
2
2σ − 1)−
σ(σ − 1)2
2σ − 1 , (A.10)
Λ4 = (ψ − σ
2
2σ − 1)(f(σ − 1)− y
d), (A.11)
Λ5 = −σ(σ − 1)
2σ − 1 (f(σ − 1)− y
∗d), (A.12)
Λ6 =
σ
2σ − 1(f(σ − 1)− y
∗d), (A.13)
Λ7 = (ψ − σ
2
2σ − 1)(f(σ − 1)− y
∗d), (A.14)
Λ8 = y
∗d(ψ − σ
2
2σ − 1)(
fσ(σ − 1)2
2σ − 1 ), (A.15)
and it was used that y = y∗ = f(σ − 1) and yx = 1
1−φ(f(σ − 1)− yd).
Note that the asymmetry of the steady state is captured by two steady state values
yd and yd∗ that represent respectively Home demand for a Home produced variety
and Foreign demand for a Foreign produced variety:
wˆ − wˆ∗ = Γ1zˆ + Γ2fˆ , (A.16)
where:
Γ1 =
f(σ−1)2(σ−φ)
2σ−1 (σ(y
d + yd∗)− f(σ − 1))
(f(σ − 1)σ(σ−1)
2σ−1 )
2 + f(σ − 1)( σ2
2σ−1 − φ)(f(σ − 1) + (yd + yd∗)(σ(σ−1)2σ−1 − 1))
,
(A.17)
Γ2 =
f(σ−1)2(σ−φ)
2σ−1 (σ(y
d + yd∗)− f(σ − 1))
(f(σ − 1)σ(σ−1)
2σ−1 )
2 + f(σ − 1)( σ2
2σ−1 − φ)(f(σ − 1) + (yd + yd∗)(σ(σ−1)2σ−1 − 1))
(A.18)
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Chapter 2
Globalization and (Lack of) Convergence
in Europe
2.1 Introduction
Convergence of living standards within Europe is a key idea behind European inte-
gration. Nevertheless, the evidence of convergence within Europe is mixed at best:
as illustrated in Figure 2.1, the relative position of most European economies in early
2010s was similar to that in early 1990s.1 In particular, Greece, Portugal, and Spain,
which started with GDP per capita significantly below the EU average, experienced
some convergence towards it in the earlier period of European integration that was
however reversed in the later years. In case of Italy, GDP per capita relative to EU
average has been continuously declining. The opposite pattern is observed in coun-
tries that started with higher than average GDP per capita: in particular, in Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden initial convergence towards the average was
followed by divergence in the later period. Ireland seems to be a notable exception, as
starting from below average it first grew fast to exceed it and then continued growing
slower, moving towards the average.
1In this paper I exclude the Eastern European transition economies from the analysis. The fast
growth of most of these economies starting from a low base has been largely attributed to structural
transformation related to transition into a market economy, which is outside the scope of this paper.
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Literature has offered various explanations for the lack of convergence in Europe,
and the topic gained more attention after the global financial crisis, especially in
the context of the performance of Southern European countries. Some authors have
noted that persistent trade deficits of the Southern European economies may not be
as benign and natural attributes of the catching-up process as was initially believed.
Others argued that if countries do not use international borrowing to build up ade-
quate production capacity, their intertemporal budget constraint (which rationalized
borrowing to finance the catching up process) may not be satisfied.2 As for the root
causes for the lack of convergence in Europe the literature has traditionally focused
on what can be referred to as the incomplete nature of integration, including the
significant ”reform gap” in Southern Europe, focusing in particular on problems with
product and factor markets and persisting heavy regulation in several areas.3
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion about lack of convergence in
Europe from a new angle, by building on theoretical and empirical literature on trade
and inequality. As Krugman (2008) has shown, trade with low-income countries has
especially important implications for inequality in relatively high-income countries.
The increase of trade between advanced and developing countries has been remarkable
in the last couple of decades, largely driven by China, whose accession into the WTO
in 2001 in fact marks a turning point in international trade.4 A number of papers have
addressed the relationship between trade and inequality in the context of the U.S. In
particular, Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2012) (hereafter: ADH) relate changes in labor
market outcomes from 1990 to 2007 across U.S. local labor markets (commuting zones)
to changes in exposure to Chinese import competition, which depends on the relative
2Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010)
3E.g. see Nowotny et al (2012) for a survey.
4Chen, Jin, and Yue (2010), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Naughton (2007)
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importance of different industries for local employment in which China has been
specializing. Other papers on the impact of globalization on income distribution in the
U.S. include Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), Liu and Trefler (2008), Ebenstein
et al. (2010) and others.
The issue of widening disparities within Europe has not been viewed in the light
of the globalization and inequality debate. Yet, as far as international trade is con-
cerned, Europe is very much a single region. Unified trade policy vis a vis non-EU
countries as well as elimination of trade barriers within the EU are the areas where
European integration has advanced to the fullest. Because of this, globalization has
implications for convergence/divergence within Europe that are quite similar to impli-
cations for inequality in the U.S., which have been widely studied both theoretically
and empirically.
In this paper I use a simple model of a small open economy that is meant to
represent a ”typical” economy in Southern Europe to show how such an economy is
affected when integration processes within the European Union are combined with
globalization. The country’s integration into the EU is modeled as lifting of trade
barriers within Europe and technology transfers as well as consumption transfers from
the ”core” to ”periphery”. The small open economy is then hit by a globalization
shock represented by increased trade between the European Union and the ”third
world” that specializes in low-skill intensive industries. I show that this shock leads
to lower income and lower employment in the traded sector in the small open econ-
omy, counteracting the positive effects of the integration processes. To relate these
results to the data I derive from the model a measure of exposure to globalization
which depends on the country’s initial industry specialization profile and find that
the countries in Europe that experienced relative declines of living standards over the
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past decade have been most exposed to globalization.
This paper relates to the recent mostly empirical work on the post global financial
crisis performance in Europe. In particular, Chen et al. (2013) point out that China
explains a large share of the rising trade deficits of periphery European economies,
as exports of Greece, Italy and Portugal have been challenged by Chinese exports.
They find that at the detailed product level China has been rapidly entering product
categories that these countries were traditionally active, implying intensified compe-
tition in the same products in the same markets. In total, the fraction of product
codes where both exporters are active in the EU 15 market continually increased and
reached more than 60 percent of all trade links at the 6-digit level by at least one
partner, i.e. China has been increasingly ”fishing in the same pool”.
Raising policy-relevant questions is a useful aspect of this paper’s approach to
the problem of (lack of) convergence in Europe. In particular, while the questions
whether a common currency or monetary policy can be optimal for all countries in the
Union has been broadly studied in the literature, the question whether a single trade
policy can be optimal for all countries has not. As Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) argue
”the current account has always been a neglected variable in management of the Euro
area and in the assessment of its member’s performance.” Policies both at the country
level and at the level of the European Union should be mindful that a unified trade
policy implies asymmetric shocks to different countries stemming from globalization.
To address this issue at the centralized level could mean developing mechanisms
of centralized risk sharing and transfers across countries of the union to mitigate
the asymmetric impact of the globalization shock. Given labor mobility between
countries as well as between sectors is limited, transfers could play an important role.
For example, continuing the parallel to the U.S. exposure to these shocks could be
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covered by a scheme like Trade adjustment Assistance (TAA) in the U.S., which is
the primary federal program that provides financial support to workers who lose their
jobs as a result of foreign trade.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the small open
economy model and discusses the model responses to trade and technology shocks.
Section 3 analyzes integration processes in Europe and globalization with the help
of the model. It then derives model-based measures of exposure to globalization,
constructed from detailed trade, employment and output data. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Model
In this section I describe a simple model of a small open economy that produces
heterogeneous tradable goods as well as a homogeneous nontradable good. Trade is
based on monopolistic competition with a ”gravity” structure as in Arkolakis et al
(2012). Labor is the only productive factor and labor supply is fixed. The small
open economy (denoted as home economy i) is first subjected to integration shocks
that include (i) lifting of trade barriers within the European Union; (ii) technology
transfers leading to lower cost of production in the traded sector; (iii) consumption
transfers, that allow the economy to run a trade deficit. Then it is subjected to a
globalization shock, whereby the trade between the European Union and the third
world increases.
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2.2.1 Households
A representative household maximizes utility from consumption:
Ui = lnCi, (2.1)
where the consumption composite C is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of nontradable
and tradable consumption:
C=C
γ
T iC
1−γ
Ni . (2.2)
The tradable consumption CT in its turn is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of sectoral
composites CTj, with equal expenditure share (γ/J) for each, defined as:
CT i =
J∏
j=1
C
γ
J
Tji. (2.3)
Each sectoral composite CTji is a composite of symmetric product varieties indexed
by ω ∈ Ω within sector j given by:
CTji = (
∫
ω∈Ω
cji(ω)
σj−1
σj )
σj
σj−1 , (2.4)
where σj > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties within
sector j and can be different in different sectors.
The household supplies inelastically Li units of labor to domestic firms at wage
Wi. The budget constraint of the household is:
PiCi = WiLi + Ti, (2.5)
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where Pi is the aggregate price index in the home economy i and Ti is a lump-
sum consumption transfer. In the aggregate, budget constraint for the economy i is
isomorphic to equation (2.5), assuming that the economy is of measure 1.
2.2.2 Firms
Firms operate either in the nontraded or traded sectors. The nontraded sector is
perfectly competitive and the the production function of the homogeneous nontraded
good is given by:
XNi = L
η
Ni, (2.6)
where LNi is labor employed in the nontraded sector, and η ∈ (0, 1), implying that
there are diminishing marginal returns to labor.
There are a total of j = [1 : J ] traded sectors and Mj monopolistically competitive
firms operate in each sector j. Each firm serves both the domestic and export markets.
The production function can be written as:
lij(ω) = αij + βijxij(ω), (2.7)
where lij(ω) is the amount of labor required to produce xij units of the traded variety
ω. αij > 0 and βij > 0 are the technology parameters of producing a traded variety
of sector j in home economy i.
As it evident from (2.7) there are increasing returns to scale in the production of
a traded variety, implying that the minimum cost of producing xij(ω) units of variety
ω in sector j is:
cij(Wi, xij(ω)) = Wi(αij + βijxij(ω)). (2.8)
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αijWi is the fixed cost and βijWi is the marginal cost. These are the sectoral
productivity parameters of the home economy i and therefore determine comparative
advantage.
As part of European integration the the country i can benefit from technology
transfer from the ”core” (EUC) which would lead to reduction of both fixed and
marginal costs of production. In particular the positive effect of FDI from EUC can be
reflected in lower fixed costs of production in i, while learning from the technologically
more advanced EUC would bring production processes in i closer to the technological
frontier and lower marginal costs of production.
In symmetric equilibrium, each variety is produced by a single monopolistically
competitive firm and the ω can be dropped. Since Ω is large, the price of each variety
is a constant markup µ = σj/(σj − 1) over the marginal cost. However, prices will
vary across domestic and export markets due to the presence of destination-specific
trade costs: to ship one unit of good j from country i to country k the firm must cover
a ”iceberg” trade cost of τijk. Therefore, the price of a variety of good j produced in
i and sold in k is given by:
Pijk =
σj
(σj − 1)βijWiτijk, (2.9)
where τijk > 1 unless i = k.
2.2.3 Trade
Demand in country k for a traded variety of j produced in country i is given by:
xijk = (
Pijk
Φjk
)−σjCTjk, (2.10)
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which is a standard expression for a CES preference structure, where Φjk is the price
index of traded sector j in market k and CTjk is the consumption of traded goods j
in market k. The sectoral price index is given by:
Φjk = [
∑
h
MhjP
1−σj
hjk ]
1
1−σj , (2.11)
where Mhj is the number of j varieties produced in region h. The sectoral price is
a measure of intensity of competition in market k. Since the constant expenditure
share property of Cobb-Douglas preferences implies that:
ΦjkCTjk =
γEk
J
, (2.12)
where Ek is the expenditure in market k: Ek = WkLi+Tk, as in the household budget
constraint. Equation (2.10) can be rewritten as:
xijk = (
P
−σj
ijk
Φ
1−σj
jk
)
γEk
J
. (2.13)
The total demand for output of an individual variety xij is therefore the sum of
demands from all destination markets:
xij =
∑
k
xijk =
∑
k
P
−σj
ijk
Φ
1−σj
jk
γEk
J
. (2.14)
2.2.4 Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for the nontraded good is:
PNiXNi = (1− γ)(WiLi + Ti). (2.15)
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Demand for goods is given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function with share γ of expen-
ditures going to traded and share 1− γ to nontraded goods.
Wages are pinned down from profit maximization in the nontrded sector:
Wi = ηPNiL
η−1
Ni . (2.16)
Note that when employment in the nontraded sector increases, wages fall. Labor
employed in the nontraded sector can alternatively be interpreted as leisure and then
wages would have to equal the marginal utility of leisure.
In the traded sector, because of free entry in equilibrium profits are zero. This
implies that the firm size is given by the cost parameters:
xij =
αij
βij
(σj − 1). (2.17)
Adjustments to shocks other than technology therefore will occur on the extensive
margin, through changes in the number of varieties in each sector: Mij.
Combining the zero-profit condition with equation (2.14) gives the market clearing
condition for traded goods:
αij
βij
(σj − 1) =
∑
k
P
−σj
ijk
Φ
1−σj
jk
γEk
J
. (2.18)
Finally, the labor market clearing conditions is:
Li = LNi +
∑
j
Mijlij, (2.19)
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which, using equation (2.7) and equation (??), can be rewritten as:
Li = LNi +
∑
j
σjMijαij, (2.20)
The endogenous variables of the model are: Wi, LiN , PiN and Mij for j = 1, ..., J
and the equilibrium is described by equations (2.15), (2.16), (2.20) and (2.18), the
latter specified for each j = 1, ..., J . All the foreign variables are exogenous, αij and
βij are the exogenous technology shocks while Ti is an exogenous transfer shock.
2.2.5 Log-Linear Solution with Trade and Technology Shocks
In this section I explore log-linear deviations from steady state due to technological
and foreign-trade-related shocks. Log-linearizing the wage equation gives:
Wˆi = PˆNi − (1− η)LˆNi, (2.21)
while the market-clearing condition for the nontraded good in log-linear terms is:
PˆNi + ηLˆNi = ρ(Wˆi + Lˆi) + (1− ρ)Tˆi, (2.22)
where: ρ = LiWi/(LiWi + Ti), the steady-state share of labor income in total expen-
diture.
Log-linearizing the labor market clearing condition and using the assumption that
Li = const gives:
Lˆi = (1−
∑
j
δij)LˆN +
∑
j
δij(Mˆij + αˆij) = 0, (2.23)
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where δij = Mijlij/Li is the steady-state share of j sector employment in total em-
ployment and therefore (1−∑j δij) is the steady-state share of nontraded employment
in total.
The price of a traded variety produced in i and sold in k in log-linear terms is:
P̂ijk = β̂ij + Ŵi + τ̂ijk, (2.24)
and the price index for the traded sector j in country k is:
Φ̂jk = − 1
σj − 1
∑
h
φhjk(M̂hj − (1− σj)(Ŵh + β̂hj + τ̂hjk)), (2.25)
where φhjk is the steady-state share of region h in purchases of sector j goods by
market k:
φhjk =
MhjPhjkxhjk∑
lMljPljkxljk
. (2.26)
The term in parentheses on the right-hand-side of equation (2.25) can be inter-
preted as change in export capability of region h in market k. For simplicity of
notation it will be denoted as Âhjk:
Âhjk = M̂hj − (1− σj)(Ŵh + β̂hj + τ̂hjk). (2.27)
Export capability of region h in market k increases if either region h produces more
varieties, wages fall in region h, productivity increases in region h or trade costs
between h and k fall. Note that only the latter is specific to k.
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Equation (2.18) in log-linear can be written as:
σjŴi + α̂ij − β̂ij =
∑
k
θijkÊk −
∑
k
θijk
∑
h
φhjkÂhjk, (2.28)
where: θijk = xijk/
∑
l xijl is region i’s steady state market share in k for sector j
goods; and:
Êk = ρkŴk + (1− ρk)T̂k (2.29)
As discussed above, there are two sources of foreign shocks important for this
model: shocks from the EU Center (EUC) and shocks from the Third World (TW).
Equation (2.28) can be rewritten to show them explicitly as:
σjŴi + α̂ij − β̂ij = θijiÊi −
∑
k
θijkφijkÂijk + ̂ΓEUCj + Γ̂TWj, (2.30)
where: ̂ΓEUCj is the combined shock originating from EUC:
̂ΓEUCj = θijEUCÊEUC −∑
k
θijkφEUCjk ̂AEUCjk, (2.31)
and: Γ̂TWj is the combined shock originating from TW:
Γ̂TWj = θijTW ÊTW −
∑
k
θijkφTWjk ̂ATWjk (2.32)
The first term on the right-hand-side of each equation (2.31) and (2.32) is increased
demand for i’s exports: expenditure respectively in EUC and TW , weighted by i’s
steady state market share for sector j. The second term shows increased competition
for i’s goods: export capability respectively in EUC and TW , weighted by each
region’s importance for i.
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The log-linear system can be solved for the endogenous variables Ŵi, P̂Ni, L̂Ni and
M̂ij as linear functions of the exogenous shocks: the transfer form the EU Center T̂i,
the sector-specific technology shocks α̂ij and β̂ij, and the sector-specific trade shocks
originating from the EUC or TW, ̂ΓEUCj and Γ̂TWj. For simplicity I assume that there
are 2 traded sectors, i.e. J = 2. This assumption is non-restrictive and similar results
can be obtained without it.5 The full log-linear solution is described in Appendix B,
while the signs of the coefficients are summarized in table below:
∂y/∂x ∂(...)/∂Γj ∂(...)/∂T ∂(...)/∂αj ∂(...)/∂βj
∂W/∂(...) + + − −
∂LN/∂(...) − + + +
∂PN/∂(...) + + − −
∂Ml/∂(...) (+) if j = l, ambiguous (−) if j = l, ambiguous if j = l,
(−) otherwise (+) otherwise (+) otherwise
As expected, positive trade shocks lead to higher wages and higher employment
in the traded sector in the small open economy. Positive trade shocks in sector j also
lead to more varieties being produced in that sector and less varieties being produced
in other sectors. If the small open economy gets higher transfers, it will have higher
wages, lower employment in the traded sector and higher prices in the nontradable
sector. Higher fixed or marginal costs in the traded sector would lead to lower wages
and lower employment in the traded sector. Higher fixed or marginal costs in one
sector would cause less varieties to be produced in that sector and more varieties to
be produced in others.
5E.g. Hanson and Xiang (2002) use a model with a similar trade structure with N number of
traded sectors.
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2.3 Integration and Globalization
In this section I employ the model described above to study the various stages of
integration and globalization in Europe. The period prior to the start of ”integration”
corresponds to the steady state of the model, where all shocks are at their long-term
levels. The home economy i is relatively poor and is specializing in the relatively
non-skill-intensive good, which is j = 2.
In the next stage the small open economy becomes integrated within the EU. In
the model ”integration” is captured by the following shocks. First, trade barriers are
lifted within the EU and, as a result, along the lines of comparative advantage i’s net
imports of the skill intensive good increase: ̂ΓEUC1 < 0 while net imports of the non-
skill-intensive good decrease: ̂ΓEUC2 > 0. (Note that at this stage Γ̂TWj = 0.) Second,
the home economy i benefits from technology transfer from the more advanced core.
This implies that both marginal costs and fixed costs parameters decrease: α̂1,2 < 0,
β̂1,2 < 0. Note that increased FDI can also be captured by α̂1,2 < 0, as a decline
in fixed costs. Finally, the home economy i receives transfers from the EU Center:
T̂ > 0. These transfers may capture not only direct transfers from the EU center (e.g.
through the government) but also other flows that may allow the home economy i to
consume more than it produces, i.e. run trade deficits. While international borrowing
is not part of the model, to the extent that such borrowing by the home economy i
could be driven by the expectations of higher future income due to integration with
EU, it can be captured in T̂ > 0.
In order to illustrate the impact of these shocks, the log-linear solution of the
above model is summarized below. The signs for the γ coefficients are given in the
summary table in the previous section (and their expressions are given in Appendix
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B).

Ŵ
L̂N
P̂N
M̂1
M̂2

=

γTW
γTLN
γTPN
γTM1
γTM2

T̂ +

γΓ1W γΓ2W
γΓ1LN γΓ2LN
γΓ1PN γΓ2PN
γΓ1M1 γΓ2M1
γΓ1M2 γΓ2M2

×
 ̂ΓEUC1 + Γ̂TW1̂ΓEUC2 + Γ̂TW2
+
+

γα1W γα2W
γα1LN γα2LN
γα1PN γα2PN
γα1M1 γα2M1
γα1M2 γα2M2

×
 α̂1
α̂2
+

γβ1W γβ2W
γβ1LN γβ2LN
γβ1PN γβ2PN
γβ1M1 γβ2M1
γβ1M2 γβ2M2

×
 β̂1
β̂2

It is evident that ”integration” leads to higher wages in the home economy i. The
net effect of increased trade γΓ1W ̂ΓEUC1 +γΓ2W ̂ΓEUC2 across the two goods is positive,
in particular, because the steady-state share of employment in the non-skilled sector
2 is higher than that in the skilled sector 1 and therefore γΓ2 > γΓ1. The response
of nontradable employment to ”integration” is ambiguous. Higher demand for the
low-skill-intensive good 2 from the EU center would lead to higher employment in
that sector more than compensating for the employment lost due to higher imports
of the high-skill-intensive good 1. Higher technology transfers, making the tradable
sector more productive, would also encourage employment in the tradable sector.
However, higher consumption transfers would work in the opposite direction. Prices
of nontradable goods will increase as all of the shocks work in the same direction. The
impact of ”integration” on the number of varieties produced in the high-skill-intensive
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and low-skill-intensive sectors (M1 and M2) is generally ambiguous. However, the
latter is likely to increase due to both trade and technology shocks.
The following stage is ”globalization”, when the EU opens to trade with the
Third World (TW), which largely specializes in the low-skill-intensive good. The
EU’s imports of mostly the low-skill-intensive good from the TW and its exports of
mostly the high-skill-intensive good to the TW increase. As far as the home economy
i is concerned ”globalization” implies that i’s net imports of the low-skill-intensive
goods increase: it consumes more of the low-skill-intensive imports from the TW
and also exports less to the EUC (because EUC switches to importing the low-skill-
intensive goods from TW). At the same time, i’s net imports of the high-skill-intensive
good are unchanged, because the TW largely does not specialize in the skill-intensive
good. Since by this stage integration processes within Europe are assumed to be over,
consumption and technology transfers as well as trade within Europe do not increase
further.
Model responses to the ”globalization” shock are straightforward, as it is described
by only the trade component: ˆΓTWC2 < 0, while T̂ = 0, α̂j = 0 and β̂j = 0. It
is important to note that the ”integration” shock did not qualitatively change the
steady state of the home economy i and in particular, i still specializes in the low-
skill-intensive good 2. Wages in i decrease because of lower demand for labor in
traded sector 2 which accounts for a large fraction of employment. As a result of
this, also employment in the tradable sector shrinks. Prices in the nontradable sector
decrease due to lower incomes. The extensive margin adjusts to the shock as the
number of firms operating in the low-skill-intensive sector decreases and the number
of firms operating in the high-skill-intensive sector increases.
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2.3.1 Empirical Analysis
In this section I aim to match the theoretical results described above to the experi-
ence of European integration and globalization. Empirically mapping many industry
specific shocks into a few aggregate outcomes is a common challenge for trade and
inequality literature. In case of studying cross-country inequality within Europe iden-
tifying the role of trade or globalization is even more difficult because there are many
country-specific variables at play, including quality of institutions, product and la-
bor market imperfection and others that have been shown to be important factors
affecting cross country differences. At the same time, lack of detailed sub-country
data make fixed effect estimations non-feasible. Nevertheless, model-consistent mea-
sures of country exposure to globalization derived from detailed trade, employment
and output data give useful insights when put side by side with individual country
performances.
Subject to availability of sub-national level data for Europe, econometric analysis
along the lines of ADH (which uses U.S. data on commuting zone level) could po-
tentially be a promising avenue of future work. In particular, ADH treat commuting
zones as local labor markets subject to differential trade shocks according on their
pattern of industry specialization and identify the impact of increased imports from
China on U.S. local labor markets, which they call the ”China syndrome”.
Data
I use data on 14 European countries’ (which exclude the transition economies of East-
ern Europe as explained above) detailed data on employment and GDP by industry
and each country’s bilateral detailed trade with China. The time period covered is
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1995-2013. Since in the international trade literature the year 2001, when China
joined the WTO, marks the ”turning point of globalization”, I divide the the time
period into pre-globalization (1995-2000) and post-globalization (2001-2013). In ad-
dition, I split the post-globalization period at 2007 to see if the global financial crisis
may have altered the role of globalization in relative country performance in Europe.
A key challenge is to match detailed trade commodity classification with employ-
ment/output industry classification. Unlike for the U.S. there are no straightforward
or universally accepted methodologies for ensuring consistency between various clas-
sifications of trade versus sectors of economic activity. As a result, I use multi-step
transformations to match trade data in SITC (4-digit classification) to employment
and national accounts in NACE classification.6 Data on international trade are taken
from the UN COMTRADE database. Data on bilateral imports and exports of Eu-
ropean countries from and to China for the period starting from late 1980s till 2013
in SITC Rev.3 classification are used. For employment as well as output EuroStat
data Labor Force Surveys on employment by detailed economic activity and GDP by
detailed sector (NACE Rev. 2) are used.
Exposure to Globalization
The sector-specific trade shock according to the model discussed in Section 2 is:
Γ̂Cj = θijCÊC −
∑
k
θijkφCjkÂCjk (2.33)
6Several methods described in particular in ”ICT sector definition: Transition from NACE Rev.
1.1. to NACE Rev. 2” and methodological manuals compiled by Eurostat have been employed.
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as defined in equation (2.32), where θijCÊC is the change in demand for home econ-
omy i’s exports to China (total expenditure in China ÊC , weighted by i’s steady
state market share for sector j in China) and
∑
k θijkφCjkÂCjk is increased Chinese
competition for i in sector j, which depends on increased export capability of China
(that could come from higher production or lower trade costs as shown in equation
(2.27)) and on how important Chinese competition is for home economy i. The term∑
k θijkφCjk will be higher if if China is an important source of supply in markets that
i also serves. For example, if Portugal specializes in textile and apparel industry then
growing Chinese exports of textile and apparel would have important implications for
Portugal in both domestic and export markets.
The impact of globalization on income in the model is given by
∑
j γΓjW Γ̂Cj, which,
as it is shown in Appendix B can be approximated by
∑
j δ˜ijκW Γ̂Cj, where δ˜ij =
Lij/LiN is the ratio of employment in tradable sector j to nontradable employment
and κW is a positive constant. Similarly, the impact of globalization on tradable
employment is given by ρi
∑
j
˜˜δijκLT Γ̂Cj, where ρi = LiWi/(LiWi + Ti) is the share
of trade imbalance in total expenditures of i.
Further, since the EU is a single trade zone, what matters for home economy i is
Chinese imports to the EU. Regardless of which EU country is the final destination
for Chinese imports, they pose the same competition to all countries. Using this, and
to facilitate mapping to data, the the globalization shock can be rewritten as:
Γ̂Cj =
1
xij
∆XijC − 1
xj
∆ICjEU , (2.34)
where: ∆XijC = xiJCEˆCj is the change in exports of good j from country i to China,
driven by growing expenditures in China and ∆ICjEU = ICjEU AˆCj is the change in
EU imports of good j from China, driven by growth in export supply capacity in
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China and reduction in trade costs.
Finally, the measure of exposure to globalization (EGL) for country income would
be:
EGLW =
∑
j
Lij
LiN
(
1
xij
∆XijC − 1
xj
∆ICjEU), (2.35)
and the measure of exposure to globalization (EGL) for tradable employment would
be:
EGLLT = ρi
∑
j
Lij
LiT
(
1
xij
∆XijC − 1
xj
∆ICjEU). (2.36)
While derived from broadly the same theoretical model the measure of exposure
to globalization in this paper is different from ADH’s measure of ”import per worker”
that they use for empirical analysis. The reason is that ADH concentrate only on
Chinese imports to the U.S. and do not consider U.S. exports to China as these are
seen as less relevant in view of the large aggregate trade deficit of the U.S. vis a
vis China. As shown below, this assumption would not be valid for some European
countries. Also, since output data are not available on U.S. commuting zone level,
ADH use the approximation xij/xj = Lij/Lj.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrates respectively exposure of wages and of tradable
employment to globalization and their components. The solid color represents the
changes between averages over 1995-2000 and 2001-2007 and the shaded color repre-
sents the changes between averages over 1995-2000 and 2001-2013. As it is evident,
the global financial crisis did not appear to change the pattern of exposure to glob-
alization. For all countries except for Belgium exposure continued to increase in the
more recent period.
Figure 2.2 shows that Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, the countries that expe-
rienced declines in GDP per capita relative to the EU14 average (as shown in Figure
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2.1) have been most exposed to globalization. It is interesting to look at exposure
to exports and imports separately. While imports have been much higher, for some
countries growing exports to China made a difference in terms of net exposure. For
example, German wages had a large negative exposure to imports from China (third
largest after Portugal and Italy), but it was compensated by the gains from higher
exports to China, which were the largest for Germany compared to the other coun-
tries.
Next, it is interesting to compare the model-based measures of exposure of trad-
able employment to globalization (Figure 2.3) and relative developments of tradable
employment in the data (Figure 2.4). Tradable employment in Portugal, Greece and
Spain appear to be most exposed to globalization according to the model, and these
are the countries that experienced declines in tradable employment over the past
decade not just in absolute terms (as percent of population) but also relative to the
European average.
2.4 Conclusion
Convergence of living standards within Europe is a key idea behind European integra-
tion. Nevertheless, the evidence of convergence within Europe is mixed at best. This
paper proposes a new approach to the problem of lack of convergence in Europe by
building on theoretical and empirical literature on trade and inequality in the U.S..
Using a simple model of trade with monopolistic competition it illustrates how glob-
alization may have affected countries in southern Europe, counteracting the positive
effects of integration processes. Measures of exposure to globalization depending on
country’s initial industry specialization profile are derived from the model and cal-
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culated using detailed trade and employment data for all European countries. Com-
paring these measures to individual country performances in Europe suggests that
globalization may have played an important role for lack or reversal of convergence
processes in Europe.
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Figure 2.1: GDP Per Capita Relative to EU14 Average
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Figure 2.2: Trade with China and Exposure of Wages to Globalization
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Figure 2.3: Trade with China and Exposure of Tradable Employment to
Globalization
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Figure 2.4: Tradable Employment as a Share of Population (solid line) and
Relative to EU14 Average (dotted line)
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Appendix B
The Log-Linear Solution of the Model
aijWˆi = bijTˆi − cijMˆij + ˆΓEUCj + ˆΓTWj − αˆij − dijβˆij, (B.1)
where:
aij = σj(1−
∑
k
θijkφijk) +
∑
k
θijkφijk − ρθiji (B.2)
bij = θiji(1− ρ) (B.3)
cij =
∑
k
θijkφijk (B.4)
dij = 1− (σj − 1)
∑
k
θijkφijk (B.5)
The system can therefore be rewritten:
Wˆi = PˆNi − (1− η)LˆNi (B.6)
LˆNi = (1− ρi)(Tˆi − Wˆi) (B.7)
LˆNi = −δ˜i1(Mˆi1 + αˆi1)− δ˜i2(Mˆi2 + αˆi2) (B.8)
ai1Wˆi = bi1Tˆi − ci1Mˆi1 + ˆΓEUC1 + ˆΓTW1 − αˆi1 − di1βˆi1 (B.9)
ai2Wˆi = bi2Tˆi − ci2Mˆi2 + ˆΓEUC2 + ˆΓTW2 − αˆi2 − di1βˆi2 (B.10)
Where ρi =
LiWi
LiWi+Ti
is the share of wage income in total expenditures in i. δ˜i1 =
δi1
1−δi1−δi2 and δ˜i2 =
δi2
1−δi1−δi2 are respectively the initial ratios of employment in each
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traded sector to employment in the nontraded sector. The rest of the terms are as
defined above.
Wˆ = γT Tˆ +
∑
j
(γΓj ˆΓEUCj + γΓj ˆΓTWj + γαjαˆj + γβjβˆj) (B.11)
LˆN = (1− ρ)(1− γT )Tˆ − (1− ρ)
∑
j
(γΓj ˆΓEUCj + γΓj ˆΓTWj + γαjαˆj + γβjβˆj) (B.12)
PˆN = (γT−(1−η)(1−ρ)(1−γT ))Tˆ+(1−(1−η)(1−ρ))
∑
j
(γΓj ˆΓEUCj+γΓj ˆΓTWj+γαjαˆj+γβjβˆj)
(B.13)
γΓ1 =
∂wˆ
∂ ˆΓEUC1
=
∂wˆ
∂ ˆΓTW1
=
δ1c2
δ1a1c2 + a2δ2c1 + c1c2(1− ρ) (B.14)
γΓ2 =
∂wˆ
∂ ˆΓEUC2
=
∂wˆ
∂ ˆΓTW2
=
δ2c1
δ2a2c1 + a1δ1c2 + c1c2(1− ρ) (B.15)
γT =
∂wˆ
∂Tˆ
=
c1c2(1− ρ) + δ1b1c2 + δ2b2c1
c1c2(1− ρ) + δ2a2c1 + δ1a1c2 (B.16)
γα1 =
∂wˆ
∂αˆ1
=
c2δ1(c1 − 1)
a1c2δ1 + a2c1δ2 + c2c1(1− ρ) (B.17)
γα2 =
∂wˆ
∂αˆ2
=
c1δ2(c2 − 1)
a2c1δ2 + a1c2δ1 + c1c2(1− ρ) (B.18)
γβ1 =
∂wˆ
∂βˆ1
= − c2d1δ1
a2δ2δ1 + a2c1δ2 + c2c1(1− ρ) (B.19)
γβ2 =
∂wˆ
∂βˆ2
= − c1d2δ2
a1δ1δ2 + a1c2δ1 + c1c2(1− ρ) (B.20)
∂LˆN
∂ ˆΓEUCj
=
∂LˆN
∂ ˆΓTWj
= −(1− ρ)γΓj ≤ 0 (B.21)
∂LˆN
∂Tˆ
= (1− ρ)(1− γT ) ≥ 0 (B.22)
∂LˆN
∂αˆj
= −(1− ρ)γαj ≥ 0 (B.23)
59
∂LˆN
∂βˆj
= −(1− ρ)γβj ≥ 0 (B.24)
∂PˆN
∂ ˆΓEUCj
=
∂LˆN
∂ ˆΓTWj
= (1 + (1− η)(1− ρ))γΓj ≥ 0 (B.25)
∂PˆN
∂Tˆ
= (γT − (1− η)(1− ρ)(1− γT )) ≥ 0 (B.26)
∂PˆN
∂αˆj
= (1 + (1− η)(1− ρ))γαj ≤ 0 (B.27)
∂PˆN
∂βˆj
= (1 + (1− η)(1− ρ))γβj ≤ 0 (B.28)
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Chapter 3
Demand Side Pricing Complementarities and
Endogenous Markups in Open Economy
3.1 Introduction
There has been a recent increased attention to pricing to market and in particular,
to its role in explaining the behavior of international relative prices. One strand of
literature, notably Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and De Blass and Russ (2012) have
adopted a game-theoretic approach to model endogenous markups that lead to large
and persistent deviations from PPP. Some papers, including Davis and Huang, (2011)
and Cook (2002) have shown that models with strategic interaction of domestic and
foreign firms can help explain business cycle volatility and cross-country comovements.
Bergin and Feenstra (2001) have shown that translog preferences can help staggered
contracts generate significantly greater endogenous persistence in the real exchange
rate that the standard CES specification does. Similar to Bergin and Feensra (2001)
this paper also explores the role of translog preferences in an international business
cycle model but assumes endogenous firm entry and flexible prices.
I introduce demand side pricing complementarities through translog preferences
into a simple two-country general equilibrium model with endogenous producer entry,
monopolistic competition, sunk entry costs, flexible prices and balanced trade. With
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translog preferences, as the number of available varieties increases, goods become
closer substitutes, causing the elasticity of substitution to increase and markups to
decrease. I show that in an open economy markups depend not only on the number
of available varieties but also on the relative marginal cost in the two countries and,
as long as iceberg trade costs are present, markups charged in domestic market are
different from those charged in export market.
I use the markup equations for translog preferences in open economy to derive
expressions for international relative prices. In particular, I show that (independent
of other aspects of the model and the nature of the shock) terms of trade move only
half-way with relative marginal cost and half-way with relative competition in the
two countries, which is an intuitive open-economy extension of the well-known result
about optimal prices under translog preferences in Feenstra (2003). This contrasts
the result from a benchmark CES model that terms of trade deteriorate one-for-one
with improvement of relative marginal costs and implies that open economy models
using translog preferences may have a better chance to match terms of trade dynamics
observed in the data.
To explore the relevance of endogenous markups for the international business
cycle I compare qualitatively the log-linear model responses to a positive Home pro-
ductivity shock to those from a benchmark model that features CES preferences but is
otherwise identical. I find that endogenous markup dynamics resulting from translog
preferences acts as a potentially important transmission mechanism. In particular, it
amplifies the responses of Foreign variables to a Home productivity improvement and,
in contrast to a benchmark CES model, causes a positive GDP comovement across
borders.
Endogenous markup dynamics also has important implications for the relation of
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observed TFP to exogenous productivity shocks. I decompose the TFP measure and
find that in addition to the exogenous productivity shock there are two endogenous
sources for movements in TFP: first, lower monopoly power due to countercyclical
markups and second, reallocation of recourses between domestic market and exports,
towards the more competitive one. An important result is that due to these endoge-
nous factors there will be a cross country correlation of measured TPFs even when
there is no cross-country correlation of exogenous productivity shocks.
This paper relates closely to Feenstra (2002) and Bergin and Feenstra (2001) in
exploring the implications of translog preferences. It also relates closely to Atkeson
and Burstein (2008) and de Blass and Russ (2010) in which pricing to market arises
from aggregate shocks and the presence of trade costs in a flexible price environment.
An important difference is that both Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and de Blass and
Russ (2010) use models with strategic interaction between firms. Similar to this pa-
per, Rodriguez-Lopez (2011) uses translog preferences, however unlike this paper it
also employs heterogeneous firms as a result of which choke prices become binding.
In terms of using translog preferences in models with endogenous entry for the anal-
ysis of macroeconomic fluctuations this paper also relates to Bilbiee, Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) that similarly predicts procyclical variety and procyclical profits with
countercyclical markups. Lewis and Stevens (2015) also study a closed economy case
with endogenous firm entry and translog preferences and by using Bayesian methods
estimate the impact of entry on markups and inflation.
While this paper does not perform quantitative analysis of international business
cycles, in terms of its qualitative results it relates to the literature that seeks to ad-
dress the comovement puzzles of standard international real business cycle (IRBC)
models. In particular, as shown by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995), Chari, Kehoe
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and McGrattan (2002) and others, benchmark IRBC models predict negative GDP
comovement across countries, while the opposite is observed in the data. Among the
active research that has offered various modification to resolve these discrepancies this
paper most closely relates to Davis and Huang (2011) and Cook (2002), which intro-
duce endogenous markups into a benchmark IRBC model through strategic decisions
made at the level of individual firms.1 By employing employing translog preferences
this paper offers a much simpler approach that nevertheless yields several intuitive
results.
Finally, this paper relates to Jaimovic and Floetotto (2008) where in a closed
economy model countercyclical markups cause endogenous procyclical movements in
measured TFP. It also relates to Holmes, Hsu and Lee (2014) who develop an index of
allocative efficiency (first best allocative efficiency being when the price ratio equals
the marginal cost ratio) that depends on the distribution of markups across goods.
They then study how international trade affects allocative efficiency in an oligopoly
model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized
model. Section 3 analyzes the model’s implications of productivity shocks and com-
pares the results to those of from benchmark CES model. Section 4 discusses the
decomposition of measured total factor productivity. Section 5 focuses on the dy-
namics of international relative prices. Section 6 concludes.
1E.g. Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Heatcote and Perri (2003) show that
cross country GDP correlation increases when international asset markets are restricted. Burstein
et al. (2008) show that international business cycle comovement increases if intermediate inputs are
added into the model.
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3.2 A Stylized General Equilibrium Model
This section describes a simple model, where the world consists of two countries,
Home and Foreign, that are symmetric in size. Foreign variables are denoted with an
asterisk. Households love variety and derive utility from consuming goods produced
in Home and Foreign and supply labor to domestic firms. N (N∗) firms operate in
Home (Foreign). Firms are monopolistically competitive and each firm produces one
variety using domestic labor. The number of varieties produced in each country is
endogenously determined in the model. There is free entry, but firms face fixed entry
costs, which consist of wages paid for introducing a new variety. International trade
is balanced and labor is not mobile across countries. Prices are flexible, which allows
to focus only on real variables. The only non-standard feature of the model is that
households’ preferences are defined according to the translog expenditure function.
3.2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes the following separable utility function, in-
creasing in the home consumption composite Ct and decreasing in labor effort l
s
t :
Ut =
C
1− 1
ψ
t
1− 1
ψ
− lst , (3.1)
where ψ ≥ 0.2
With translog preferences the consumption composite Ct is associated with the
2This formulation assumes constant marginal disutility of labor, corresponding to an infinite
Frisch elasticity of labor.
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welfare-based price index Pt given by the translog expenditure function as in Feenstra,
2002.
lnPt =
N˜t∑
i=1
αit ln pit +
1
2
N˜t∑
i=1
N˜t∑
j=1
γijt ln pit ln pjt, (3.2)
where pit is the price of an individual variety and N˜t is the number of varieties available
for consumptions. In open economy, where Home produces Nt varieties and Foreign
produces N∗t varieties and all varieties are traded N˜t = Nt + N
∗
t . γijt = γjit and,
to ensure that the expenditure function is homogenous of degree one, the following
restrictions hold:
∑N˜
i=1 αit = 1 and
∑N˜
i=1 γijt = 0. In addition, to ensure that all
goods enter ’symmetrically’ into the expenditure function the following restrictions
are imposed:
αit =
1
N˜t
, (3.3)
γiit =
−γ(N˜t − 1)
N˜t
, (3.4)
γijt =
γ
N˜t
, (3.5)
where γ is a positive constant. It can be easily confirmed that these restrictions
satisfy the conditions specified above for homogeneity of degree one.
In a symmetric equilibrium, for Home consumers all Home produced varieties will
have the same price pt(h) and all Foreign produced varieties will have the same price
pt(f).
3 The share of each variety i in expenditure can be computed by differentiating
the unit expenditure function with respect to ln pit, which gives:
s(h)t =
1
N˜t
+
γN∗t
N˜t
(ln ρt(f)− ln ρt(h)) (3.6)
3Similarly, in Foreign, all Foreign produced varieties will have the same price p∗t (f) and all Home
produced varieties will have the same price p∗t (h).
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for Home produced varieties, and
s(f)t =
1
N˜t
+
γNt
N˜t
(ln ρt(h)− ln ρt(f)) (3.7)
for Foreign produced varieties, where ρt(h) = pt(h)/Pt, is the real price of Home
produced varieties for Home consumers and ρt(f) = pt(f)/Pt is the real price of
Foreign produced varieties for Home consumers.4 As in Feenstra, 2002 the elasticity
of demand is given by:
ηit = 1 +
γ
sit
, (3.8)
which in an open economy setting will be different for Home and Foreign produced
varieties. Subsequently, the markup is is given by the following expression:
µit = 1 +
1
ηit − 1 = 1 +
sit
γ
, (3.9)
implying that the markups for Home and Foreign produced varieties can be expressed
respectively as:
lnµ(h)t =
1
γN˜t
+
N∗t
N˜t
(ln ρ(f)t − ln ρ(h)t), (3.10)
lnµ(f)t =
1
γN˜t
+
Nt
N˜t
(ln ρ(h)t − ln ρ(f)t). (3.11)
It is evident from these equations that in an open economy model with translog
preferences markups depend not only on the number of varieties (as in a closed econ-
omy model) but also on Home to Foreign relative prices.
Domestic households own the domestic firms. They finance the fixed costs of
introducing new varieties and in return receive all the profits earned by the firms. In
4Details of this and subsequent derivations are given in Appendix C.
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addition, they earn wages Wt on labor supplied to the domestic firms. The budget
constraint of the representative household therefore is:
∫ Nt
0
pt(h)ct(h)dh+
∫ N∗t
0
pt(f)ct(f)df + It = ltWt + Πt, (3.12)
where ct(h) (ct(f)) is consumption of a Home (Foreign) variety, and pt(h) (pt(f)) is
its respective price. It is the representative household’s share of cost of introducing
new varieties, which can be thought of as ’investment’, while Πt represents the equal
share of profits that the household receives. Dividing the household budget constraint
by the Home consumption price index, it can be written in real terms:
∫ Nt
0
ρt(h)ct(h)dh+
∫ N∗t
0
ρt(f)ct(f)df + it = ltwt + pit, (3.13)
where: wt = Wt/Pt, it = It/Pt, and pit = Πt/Pt.
3.2.2 Firms
Nt firms operate in Home, each producing a different variety. Strategic interaction
between firms does not arise due to the assumption that the number of firms operating
at any point in time is large. Production uses only domestic labor and aggregate labor
productivity zt represents effectiveness of one unit of labor. Production function for
a representative firm is:
yt = ztl
d
t , (3.14)
where ldt is the firm’s labor demand for production purposes. To start the production
of a variety a firm needs to bear a fixed cost of f units of labor.
Optimizing firms set prices at a markup over marginal cost. I assume that market
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segmentation is possible, i.e. firms are able to set different prices in the domestic and
export markets. Prices for varieties consumed in Home are:
pt(h) = µt(h)
Wt
zt
, (3.15)
or, in real terms, dividing by the aggregate price index Pt:
ρt(h) = µt(h)
wt
zt
. (3.16)
Prices for Home produced varieties consumed in Foreign are:
εpt(h)
∗ = µ∗t (h)
Wt
zt
(1 + τ), (3.17)
where εt is the nominal exchange rate (units of Home currency per units of Foreign)
and τ ≥ 0 is the iceberg trade cost parameter. Dividing both sides by the Foreign
price index P ∗t , the real price of Home varieties consumed in Foreign is:
tρt(h)
∗ = µ∗t (h)
wt
zt
(1 + τ), (3.18)
where  is the real exchange rate:  = εP ∗/P representing the relative price of a
Foreign consumption basket in terms of Home. In similar fashion, the real price of
Foreign produced varieties consumed in Foreign is:
ρt(f)
∗ = µ∗t (f)
w∗t
z∗t
, (3.19)
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and the real price of Foreign produced varieties consumed in Home is:
ρt(f) = µt(f)
w∗t
z∗t
(1 + τ)t. (3.20)
As it is clear, pricing to market arises due to different markups in domestic and
export markets.
A representative Home firm serves both the Home and Foreign markets. The
goods market clearing condition is:
yt = Lct(h) + (1 + τ)c
∗
t (h)L
∗, (3.21)
where L (L∗) is the population size of Home (Foreign). The first term on the right
hand side of (3.21) is the domestic demand and the second term is exports of the Home
produced good. The presence of the iceberg trade cost parameter in the equation
indicates that in order to supply Foreign consumers with one unit of its output the
Home firm needs to ship (1 + τ) units to Foreign.
Operating profits of a representative Home firm equal total sales minus total
production costs and are given by the following expression, which is written in real
terms:
dt = (µt(h)− 1)wt
zt
Lct(h) + (µ
∗
t (h)− 1)
wt
zt
L∗c∗t (h)(1 + τ), (3.22)
where the first term on the right hand side is profits from domestic sales and the
second term is profits from exports.
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3.2.3 Equilibrium
Since there are no state variables in the model, starting from this section time sub-
scripts will be omitted for ease of notation. The first-order conditions of Household
optimization give the following expressions for consumption and labor effort in terms
of real wages:
C = wψ, (3.23)
ls = wψ−1. (3.24)
Consumption of each individual variety is given by:
ci = si
C
ρi
, (3.25)
which implies that for Home varieties consumed in Home are:
c(h) =
γ lnµ(h)
ρ(h)
C, (3.26)
and Foreign varieties consumed in Home are:
c(f) =
γ lnµ(f)
ρ(f)
C. (3.27)
Combining the markup equations (3.10) and (3.11) and their Foreign counter-
parts with pricing equations (3.15)-(3.20) gives the following expressions for the four
markups as functions of numbers of Home and Foreign varieties, wages and exchange
rate (details of these derivations are in Appendix C): the markup charged by Home
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firms in Home:
lnµ(h) =
1
γN˜
+
N∗
2N˜
ln(TOL(1 + τ)), (3.28)
the markup charged by Home firms in Foreign:
lnµ(h)∗ =
1
γN˜
− N
∗
2N˜
ln
1 + τ
TOL
, (3.29)
the markup charged by Foreign firms in Foreign:
lnµ(f)∗ =
1
γN˜
+
N
2N˜
ln
1 + τ
TOL
, (3.30)
and the markup charged by Foreign firms in Home:
lnµ(f) =
1
γN˜
− N
2N˜
ln(TOL(1 + τ)), (3.31)
where TOL denotes ’terms of labor’ and is defined as:
TOL =
w∗/z∗
w/z
. (3.32)
In equilibrium with free entry, optimal investment into new varieties implies that
entry costs must equal operating profits: fw = d. Combining equation (3.22) and its
Foreign counterpart with expressions for consumption of Home and Foreign varieties
(equations (3.26), (3.27) and their Foreign counterparts), and using (3.23) the zero
profit condition for Home firms is:
(µ(h)− 1) lnµ(h)
µ(h)
wψ−1 +
(µ∗(h)− 1) lnµ∗(h)
µ∗(h)
w∗ψ
w
=
f
Lγ
, (3.33)
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and for Foreign, the zero profit condition is:
(µ∗(f)− 1) lnµ∗(f)
µ∗(f)
w∗ψ−1 +
(µ(f)− 1) lnµ(f)
µ(f)
wψ
w∗
=
f ∗
Lγ
. (3.34)
Since trade is balanced, Home imports have to equal Home exports:
N∗Lc(f)ρ(f) = NL∗c∗(h)ρ∗(h), (3.35)
which can be rewritten using the expressions for consumption as:
N∗Lwψ lnµ(f) = NL∗w∗ψ lnµ∗(h). (3.36)
Finally, labor market clearing conditions requiring that labor supplied in each
country be demanded either for production or for innovation, close the model. For
Home, the labor market condition is:
f iN +
y
z
N = Lwψ−1, (3.37)
which, using the expression for output for Home firms (3.21) and rearranging, can be
rewritten as:
f iN +
Lγ lnµ(h)
µ(h)
wψ−1N +
L∗γ lnµ∗(h)
µ∗(h)
w∗ψ
w
N = Lwψ−1. (3.38)
f i (for fixed cost of innovation) is the labor effort required to introduce new
varieties in the economy. Each individual firm treats it as given (f) however in
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equilibrium it is given by the following expression:
f iN =
αLzwψ−1
wβ
, (3.39)
where β > 0 and 0 > α ≥ 1. The intuition behind this expression is that the share
of total effective labor effort in the economy (Lzwψ−1) that is used for innovation
declines as wage increases.
Equilibrium then is described by the markup equations ((3.28)-(3.31)), zero-profit
conditions ((3.33)-(3.34)), labor market clearing conditions ((3.38) and its Foreign
counterpart), and the balanced trade condition ((3.36)). The endogenous variables
of the model are: µ(h), µ∗(h), µ∗(f), µ(h), w, w∗, N , N∗, . The exogenous shocks
are z and f .
3.2.4 Steady State and Calibration
In this subsection I solve for the steady state, where zt = z
∗
t = 1 ft = f
∗
t = fss and
and all endogenous variables are constant. Since in steady state Home and Foreign
are symmetric, it follows that w = w∗ = wss, N = N∗ = Nss,  = 1. A symmetric
steady state implies that markups changed by Home firms in Home in steady state
would be equal to markups changed by Foreign firms in Foreign. We can refer to this
as ’domestic markup’:
lnµ(h)ss = lnµ
∗(f)ss =
1
2γNss
+
ln(1 + τ)
4
, (3.40)
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and markups changed by Home firms in Foreign in steady state would be equal to
markups changed by Foreign firms in Home (’export markup’):
lnµ∗(h)ss = lnµ(f)ss =
1
2γNss
− ln(1 + τ)
4
. (3.41)
As these equations show, domestic markups are higher than export markups due
to existence of trade costs.
It is interesting to relate these results to the literature on trade liberalization and
competition. Equation (3.40) predicts that falling trade costs would reduce domestic
markups. This is in line with the empirical evidence in Levinson (1993), Harrison
(1994), Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) and others, according to which trade liberal-
ization has pro-competitive effects among domestic producers as foreign competition
forces them to reduce markups. Equation (3.41) predicts on the the other hand that
everything else unchanged trade liberalization would increase the market power of
exporters. This is consistent with the findings of Atkeson and Burstein (2007,2008),
Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2012) and Arkolakis et al. (2012) which demosntrate
that trade costs reduce exporter markups.
Steady state wages are given by:
wψ−1ss = w
∗ψ−1
ss =
fss
γL
(
(µ(h)ss − 1) lnµ(h)ss
µ(h)ss
+
(µ(f)ss − 1) lnµ(f)ss
µ(f)ss
)−1, (3.42)
and the steady state numbers of varieties are expressed as:
Nss = N
∗
ss =
L
fss
wψ−1−βss . (3.43)
For analyzing the model’s responses to productivity shocks I calibrate the param-
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eters to facilitate comparison with results of a benchmark CES model (described in
Appendix E). In particular, the average of domestic and export markups in steady
state is calibrated to match the constant markup of the CES model: value of γ = 0.02
corresponds to a standard value of 6 for the elasticity of substitution of the CES model
σ. The rest of the parameters in both models are as follows: labor supply elasticity
ψ = 1.3, iceberg trade costs parameter τ = 0.2, and the parameter that governs
the sensitivity labor allocation between production and innovation to wage β = 0.5,
α = 1.
3.3 Responses to Productivity Shocks
In this section I explore qualitative model responses to a positive Home productivity
shock. The model is log-linearized around the steady state assuming that Home is hit
by a positive productivity shock that increases the efficiency of production (z-shock:
zˆ > 0); reduces the cost of entry: (f-shock: fˆ < 0) or both. There are no shocks
to Foreign. The full log-linearized system is described in Appendix D, however, the
dynamics of markups, which is central for the paper, is given below.
µ̂(h) =
1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂∗ (3.44)
µ̂(h)∗ =
1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂∗ (3.45)
µ̂(f)∗ = −1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂∗ (3.46)
µ̂(f)∗ = −1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂∗ (3.47)
As these equations show, all markup responses depend negatively on both Home
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and Foreign number of varieties, with appropriate weights attached to each. In par-
ticular, if competition in one market (domestic or export) is relatively weak then a
change in the number of varieties competing in that market becomes more important
for the markup. Further, markups charged by Home firms depend positively on terms
of labor, i.e. when Home effective labor becomes relatively cheap, Home firms can
enjoy higher markups in both domestic and export markets. Markups charged by
Foreign firms, on the other hand depend negatively on terms of labor. The intuition
is that when Home experiences a shock leading to a fall in its relative marginal cost
of production (such as improvement in productivity) Home firms will capture some
of the benefits through higher markups.5
Since the rest of the model is relatively standard, it is interesting to see how
using translog preferences instead of CES affects the qualitative responses of key
variables to productivity shocks. To illustrate the role of translog preferences and
endogenous markups, the results are compared to those from a benchmark CES model
(described in Appendix E) as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (z-shock), Figure 3.2 (f-shock),
Figure 3.3 (combined shock). Since the models are identical except for the preference
specification, endogenous markups are the only source of differences in responses to
shocks.
Both increased efficiency of production (z-shock) and lower cost of innovation
(f-shock) result in higher wages as they increase the demand for labor both for pro-
duction and for innovation. Since ψ > 1 labor supply also increases but not enough
to to offset the demand effect on wages. The number of varieties increases due to
both lower entry cost (in case of Home only) and higher demand (in both Home and
5It is worth emphasizing that these expressions for markups are quite general in the sense that
they only depend on the assumed preference specification and are independent of other components
of the model.
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Foreign), as consumption increases more than proportionately with wage provided
that ψ > 1. A factor working in the opposite direction is that higher wages trigger
labor to move more towards production and away from innovation. In case of For-
eign, where entry cost does not decline, this leads to a fall in the number of varieties.
The responses of wages and numbers of varieties are similar in CES and translog
models, except that in the translog model the impact on Foreign variables is more
pronounced due to the presence of an additional transmission mechanism, namely the
markup dynamics.
As shown in Figures 3.1-3.3, Home productivity improvement causes all markups
to decline in the translog model. In case of f-shock markups charged by Home firms
decline due to both lower terms of labor and higher number of varieties, while in
case z-shock they decline because the effect of higher number of varieties dominates.
Similarly, markups charged by Foreign firms decline with z-shock due to both lower
terms of labor and higher number of varieties, while in case f-shock they decline
because the effect of higher number of varieties outweighs the gains that Foreign
firms enjoy due to more favorable terms of labor.
A notable difference between translog and CES results relates to the response of
output per firm (firm size) or the so called intensive margin of adjustment. While in
the CES model, firm size in log-linear terms is simply given by yˆ = zˆ+ fˆ (and analo-
gously for Foreign), in the translog model due to endogenous markups re-orientation
between domestic export and markets as a result of productivity shocks becomes
important. In the translog model Home firm size in log-linear terms is given by:
ŷ = ŷd
ydss
ydss + y
x
ss
+ ŷx
yxss
ydss + y
x
ss
, (3.48)
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where the demand by the domestic market is:
ŷd = ẑ + (ψ − 1)ŵ + 1
µ(h)ss − 1 µ̂(h), (3.49)
and demand by the export market is:
ŷx = ẑ + ̂+ ψŵ∗ − ŵ + 1
µ(f)ss − 1 µ̂
∗(h). (3.50)
As shown in Figures 3.1-3.2, Home firm size increases with z-shock and declines with
f-shock in both translog and CES models. In case of combined shock illustrated in
Figure 3.3 (where productivity shocks affecting efficiency of production and innovation
are assumed to be perfectly symmetric: zˆ = 1 and fˆ = −1) the firm size is unchanged
in the CES model. In the translog model instead, firm size increases as endogenous
markups lead to an intensive margin of adjustment. Moreover, while in the CES
model there is no adjustment on the intensive margin in Foreign, in the translog model
Foreign firm size reacts to Home productivity improvement in the same direction (but
smaller magnitude) as Home firm size.
Another interesting result is that the translog model generates a positive GDP
co-movement, unlike the CES model. GDP is defined as:
GDP = Nρ(h)c(h) +Nρ∗(h)c∗(h). (3.51)
It is useful to define:
y˜ = ρ(h)c(h) + ρ∗(h)c∗(h), (3.52)
as GDP by firm, which is output by firm measured in units of consumption.6 Then
6Note that all firms are identical, even though each firm charges a different price in Home market
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(3.51) can be written as GDP = Ny˜. In log-deviations from steady state GDP is:
ĜDP = N̂ + γNss[µ̂(h) + µ̂∗(h) + ψ lnµ(h)ssŵ + ψ lnµ(f)ss(ŵ∗ + ̂)]. (3.53)
The positive comovement between Home and Foreign GDPs is driven by the endoge-
nous comovement of markups charged by Home and Foreign firms and the presence
of intensive margin of adjustment in case of the translog model. Despite the fact
that Foreign produces a smaller number of varieties as a result of Home productivity
improvement, Foreign GDP still increases because each Foreign firm produces more.
3.4 Total Factor Productivity
This section explores the the model’s implications for the measurement of technol-
ogy shocks, the relation of exogenous productivity shocks to observed total factor
productivity (TFP) dynamics and its correlation across countries.
Measured TFP or the Solow residual is GDP divided by total factor input:
TFP =
Ny˜
Lwψ−1
, (3.54)
From the labor market condition (3.38), we have:
N =
Lwψ−1z
fz + y
, (3.55)
where y = yd + yx, yd = Lc(h) is the demand for a Home-produced variety by Home
consumers and yx = (1 + τ)L∗c∗(h) is the demand for a Home-produced variety by
versus Foreign market.
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Foreign consumers (i.e. Home exports) as in equation (3.21).
From from the zero-profit condition (3.33) we have:
fz = yd(lnµ(h)) + yx(lnµ∗(h)). (3.56)
Using the last two expressions (3.54) can be rewritten as:
TFP =
zy˜
(lnµ(h) + 1)yd + (lnµ∗(h) + 1)yx
, (3.57)
or using the approximation: lnµ(h) = µ(h)− 1 and lnµ(f) = µ(f)− 1:
TFP =
zy˜
µ(h)yd + µ∗(h)yx
. (3.58)
This expression can be viewed as an open-economy model analogy to the result
in Jaimovich Floetotto, 2008 for closed economy: TFP = z/µ(N).
In log-linear deviation from its steady state in response to exogenous productivity
shock z, TPF is given by:
T̂FP = zˆ − µ̂(h) µ(h)ssy
d
ss
µ(h)ssydss + µ(f)ssy
x
ss
− µ̂∗(h) µ(f)ssy
d
ss
µ(h)ssydss + µ(f)ssy
x
ss
+ (3.59)
+[̂˜y − ŷd µ(h)ssydss
µ(h)ssydss + µ(f)ssy
x
ss
− ŷd µ(f)ssy
x
ss
µ(h)ssydss + µ(f)ssy
x
ss
]
This result illustrates that the observed TFP change differs from the exogenous
productivity shock z because there are also endogenous changes in observed produc-
tivity. These changes result from lower markups charged by Home firms in domestic
and export markets (the second and third terms on the right-hand-side) and from
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changes reallocation of resources (the last term on the right-hand-side).
Lower markups or increased degree of competition lead to higher measured TFP
because a positive technology shock lowers marginal cost of production and fixed cost
of entry, leading to increased profit opportunities and increased number of producers
as a result. Lower markups mean that the monopolistically competitive producers
increase output per unit of input, i.e. efficiency gains materialize. Also note that
domestic and export markups enter the equation for TFP with appropriate weights:
the coefficients represent the weight of the respective market (domestic or export) in
the total sales of of a firm. The second source of endogenous productivity variation
relates to changes in allocation of production between domestic market and exports
induced by the productivity shock z.
An important implication of the above decomposition of observed TFP into ex-
ogenous and endogenous components in an open economy model is that there is
comovement in observed TFP s in Home and Foreign even when there is no corre-
lation in exogenous technology shocks. This results primarily from comovement of
markups that Home and Foreign firms charge in both domestic and export markets,
that in turn depend on both Home and Foreign number of varieties. In other words,
when Home experiences a positive productivity shock z, observed TFP will also im-
prove in Foreign due to decrease in monopoly power and reallocation of production
towards the more competitive market in Foreign while there is no change in Foreign
exogenous productivity z∗.
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3.5 International Relative Prices
This section focuses on terms of trade and real exchange rate derived from the translog
expenditure functions in a two-country model. The results in this section are general
in the sense that they follow only from the preference structure (from which the
markup equations are derived) and standard pricing equations and are independent
of other aspects of the model.
3.5.1 The Terms of Trade
Terms of trade for Home is the ratio of Home export price P (H)∗ to Home import
price P (F ). With translog preferences and all goods traded, the respective indices
are given by the following expressions.
lnP (H)∗t =
N∗∑
i=1
αi ln p
∗
it(h) +
1
2
N∗∑
i=1
N∗∑
j=1
γij ln p
∗
it(h) ln p
∗
jt(h) (3.60)
lnP (F )t =
N∑
i=1
αi ln pit(f) +
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
γij ln pit(f) ln pjt(f) (3.61)
If symmetry and homotheticity conditions analogous to (3.3)-(3.5) are satisfied,
it is straightforward to show that lnP (H)∗t = ln p(h)
∗
t and lnP (F )t = ln p(f)t.
lnTOT = ln p(h)∗ + ln ε− ln p(f), (3.62)
and using the pricing equations (3.18) and (3.20) can be rewritten as:
lnTOT = lnµ∗(h)− lnµ(f)− lnTOL, (3.63)
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which clearly shows the role of endogenous markups in determining the terms of trade.
Using the log-linearized versions of markup equations gives the following equation
for terms of trade deviation from steady state as a result of an exogenous productivity
shock:
T̂OT = −1
2
T̂OL+
ln(1 + τ)
4
(Nˆ − Nˆ∗), (3.64)
where: ˆTOL = −wˆ+ ŵ∗+ ˆ+ zˆ as defined before. Using the expressions for domestic
and export markups in steady state (3.40) and (3.41) (3.64) can be also rewritten as:
T̂OT = −1
2
T̂OL+
1
2
(lnµ(h)ss − lnµ(f)ss)(Nˆ − Nˆ∗). (3.65)
This is a very simple and intuitive result, which can be viewed as an open-economy
extension of the famous result in Feenstra, 2002 according to which optimal prices
place one-half of their weight on marginal costs and the other half on competitors’
prices. Equation 3.65 states that in an open economy setting terms of trade move only
half-way with the relative marginal cost and half-way with the relative competition
in the two countries.
Clearly, (3.64) provides for a richer dynamics for terms of trade than the standard
CES model (according to which T̂OT = −T̂OL) and thus has a greater potential
to match moments observed in the data. In particular, while in a standard model
with CES preferences a productivity improvement leading to improvement of Home’s
relative cost of effective labor would automatically lead to deterioration of TOT , it
may not be the case in this model. The sensitivity of TOT to the relative marginal
cost is less (by half) and the extensive margin of adjustment is explicitly in the
equation (with a coefficient that is increasing in trade costs). In particular, this
implies that TOT may improve following a positive Home productivity shock that
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leads to a fall in relative marginal cost (TOL) if Home to Foreign differential in the
number of produced varieties increases enough.
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) document that manufacturing terms of trade are
significantly less volatile than manufacturing PPI-based real exchange rate in the
U.S. and other major developed countries. Equation (3.64) would fit this empirical
finding, as it shows that: (i) regardless of the nature of the shock, terms of trade move
only half-way with terms of labor, which is a theoretical counterpart of PPI-based
real exchange rate measure that Atkeson and Burstein (2008) use; and (ii) as long as
the Home to Foreign differential in the number of varieties comoves positively with
terms of labor (as is likely to be the case with productivity shocks) the volatility of
terms of trade would be smaller.
3.5.2 The Real Exchange Rate
The real exchange rate is the relative price of Foreign consumption in terms of Home
consumption:
lnQ = lnP ∗ + ln ε− lnP. (3.66)
As shown in Appendix F, it can be rewritten as:
lnQ = lnTOT +
1
2
lnTOL(1 +
γ ln(1 + τ)NN∗
N +N∗
) + ln(1 + τ)
N −N∗
2(N +N∗)
. (3.67)
It is worth noting that since there are no nontraded goods and consumers in Home
and Foreign have access to the same set of varieties, welfare-based and data consistent
measures of price indices are equivalent.7
7This is similar to the result in Cacciatore, Ghironi, Stebunovs (2015) where some varieties are
exogenously non-traded and welfare-consistent and data-consistent real exchange rates are shown to
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or in log-linear terms:
Qˆ = ˆTOL
ln(1 + τ)γN
4
+ (Nˆ − Nˆ∗) ln(1 + τ)
2
. (3.68)
Note that PPP holds and Qˆ = 0 when τ = 0.
Coefficients of both T̂OL and (N̂ − N̂∗) are strictly positive as long as trade
costs are present. When home effective labor becomes cheaper, the relative price of
Home consumption decreases because due to presence of trade costs Home consumers
enjoy more of the benefits of cheaper home goods than Foreign consumers do. When
the number of Home produced varieties increases relative to Foreign again Home
consumption becomes relatively cheaper since the number of varieties on which Home
consumers do not pay trade costs increases with a positive welfare effect.8
Equation (3.68) can also be rewritten to illustrate the dynamics of the real ex-
change rate versus that of the term of trade:
Qˆ = 2 ˆTOT + ˆTOL(1 +
ln(1 + τ)γN
4
), (3.69)
which shows that for example when terms of trade deteriorate (Home exports be-
come relatively cheap) the real exchange can still improve (the relative price Home
consumption can decrease) if the relative cost of Home labor falls enough. Higher
trade costs would make this more likely to happen.
be the same and is different from the result in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) where some varieties are
endogenously non-traded and welfare-consistent price indices have to be adjusted by removing the
pure variety effect in order to obtain price data-consistent indices.
8This result is parallel to the one in Cacciatore, Ghironi and Stebunovs, 2015 where in a model
with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences the changes in real exchange rate is decomposed into changes in terms
of labor and the varieties differential.
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Finally, it is useful to rewrite equation (3.68) using the expressions for markups
in steady state (3.40) and (3.41):
Qˆ =
1
2
ˆTOL
lnµ(h)ss − lnµ(f)ss
lnµ(h)ss + lnµ(f)ss
+ (Nˆ − Nˆ∗)(lnµ(h)ss − lnµ(f)ss). (3.70)
Since in a symmetric steady state markups charged in domestic and export mar-
kets are different only because of trade costs, equation (3.70) shows that (i) the real
exchange rate will move more with the varieties differential if the relative monopoly
power in domestic market versus export market is higher; and that (ii) the real ex-
change rate will move more with the relative cost of home effective labor if the relative
monopoly power in domestic market versus export market is higher while the average
monopoly power in both markets is lower.
3.6 Conclusion
The role of pricing to market in explaining the behavior of international relative
prices as well as national and international business cycle dynamics has gained recent
attention. This paper seeks to contribute to this literature by departing from the
common assumption of CES preferences and using instead translog preferences in
an open economy setting. I show that in an open economy markups depend not
only on the number of available varieties but also on the relative marginal cost in
the two countries and trade costs. Endogenous markups imply a richer dynamics
for international relative prices and in particular allow for the possibility of terms of
trade to improve even when relative marginal costs fall.
To explore the relevance of endogenous markups for the international business
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cycle I compare qualitatively the log-linear model responses to a positive Home pro-
ductivity shock to those from a benchmark model that features CES preferences
and find that endogenous markup dynamics resulting from translog preferences acts
as a potentially important transmission mechanism. In particular, it amplifies the
responses of Foreign variables to a Home productivity improvement and causes a
positive GDP comovement across borders. Furhter, endogenous markups give rise to
endogenous procyclical movements in measured TFP due to lower monopoly power
and re-allocation of recourses between domestic and export markets. This means
that there will be a cross country correlation of measured TPFs even when there is
no cross-country correlation of exogenous productivity shocks.
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Figure 3.1: Responses to Home Productivity z-Shock in Translog versus
CES Models
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Figure 3.2: Responses to Home Productivity f-Shock in Translog versus
CES Models
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Figure 3.3: Responses to Combined Home Productivity Shock in Translog
versus CES Models
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Appendix C
Translog Preferences, Expenditure Shares, and Markups
The translog expression for unit expenditure function for Home country can be written
as:
lnP =
N∑
i=1
αi ln pi(h) +
N∗∑
i=1
αi ln pi(f) +
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
γij ln pi(h) ln pj(f)
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∗∑
j=1
γij ln pi(h) ln pj(f) +
1
2
N∗∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
γij ln pi(h) ln pj(f)
+
1
2
N∗∑
i=1
N∗∑
j=1
γij ln pi(h) ln pj(f), (C.1)
where γij = γji. pi(h) is the price of a Home produced variety and pi(f) is the price
of a Foreign produced variety.1 The unit expenditure function for Foreign can be
defined in a similar fashion. Homogeneity of degree one requires that
∑N˜
i=1 αi = 1
and
∑N˜
i=1 γij = 0, while requiring that all varieties enter ”symmetrically” into the ex-
penditure function implies the following restrictions: αi = 1/N˜ , γii = −γ(N˜ − 1)/N˜ ,
γij = γ/N˜ .
The expenditure share of each variety can be computed by differentiating the
expenditure function with respect to the price of that variety.
si =
∂lnP
∂ln pi
= αi +
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln pj, (C.2)
1The notation difference from (3.2) is due to grouping Home and Foreign prices.
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Since we care only about real variables, it is useful to rewrite the expenditure
function in real terms. Using the shorter notation below:
lnP =
N˜∑
i=1
αi ln pi +
1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln pi ln pj, (C.3)
and subtracting lnP from both sides, the first term on right-hand-side becomes:
N˜∑
i=1
αi ln pi−lnP =
N˜∑
i=1
αi ln pi−
N˜∑
i=1
αi lnP =
N˜∑
i=1
αi(ln pi−lnP ) =
N˜∑
i=1
αi ln ρi, (C.4)
where
ρi =
pi
P
. (C.5)
The second term on right-hand-side of (C.3) can be rewritten as:
1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij(ln pi − lnP )(ln pj − lnP ) = 1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij(ln pi ln pj)−
1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij(ln pi lnP )− 1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij(lnP ln pj) +
1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij(lnP lnP ). (C.6)
Since he last three terms of this expression are zero, the following is true:
1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln pi ln pj =
1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln ρi ln ρj, (C.7)
yielding the following for the expenditure function:
0 =
N˜∑
i=1
αi ln ρi +
1
2
N˜∑
i=1
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln ρi ln ρj. (C.8)
96
Further, the equation for expenditure share of each variety (C.2) can be rewritten
as:
si = αi +
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln ρj, (C.9)
where the following was used:
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln ρj =
N˜∑
j=1
γij(ln pj − lnP ) =
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln pj − lnP
N˜∑
j=1
γij =
N˜∑
j=1
γij ln pj, (C.10)
and which is intuitive because the share of expenditure on each variety is a real
variable.
In symmetric equilibrium, the share of each Home produced variety respectively
becomes:
s(h) = αi + ln ρ(h)((N − 1)γij + γii) + ln ρ(f)N∗γij, (C.11)
and for each foreign produced variety:
s(f) = αi + ln ρ(h)tNγij + ln ρ(f)t((N
∗ − 1)γij + γii). (C.12)
Using the above parameter restrictions, these can be rewritten respectively as:
s(h) =
1
N˜
+
γN∗
N˜
(ln ρ(f)− ln ρ(h)), (C.13)
s(f) =
1
N˜
+
γN
N˜
(ln ρ(h)− ln ρ(f)). (C.14)
The expressions can be also be rewritten using the difference between the price of
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a specific variety and average price as in Feenstra 2002.
si =
1
N˜
+ γ(ln p− ln pi) (C.15)
where
ln p =
N˜∑
i=1
ln pi
N˜
=
N
N˜
ln p(h) +
N∗
N˜
ln p(f) (C.16)
For home produced varieties i = 1, ..., N
si =
1
N˜
+ γ(
N
N˜
ln p(h) +
N∗
N˜
ln p(f)− ln p(h)) = 1
N˜
+
γN∗
N˜
(ln p(f)− ln p(h)), (C.17)
and for Foreign produced varieties i = N + 1, ..., N˜
si =
1
N˜
+ γ(
N
N˜
ln p(h) +
N∗
N˜
ln p(f)− ln p(f)) = 1
N˜
+
γN
N˜
(ln p(h)− ln p(f)) (C.18)
The elasticity of demand is defined as:
ηi = 1− d ln si
d ln ρi
, (C.19)
which, following Feenstra, 2002 it can be approximated as:
ηi = 1 +
γ
si
. (C.20)
Subsequently, the markup is is given by the following expression:
µi = 1 +
1
ηi − 1 = 1 +
si
γ
. (C.21)
This implies that the markups for Home and Foreign produced varieties can be
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expressed respectively as:
lnµ(h) =
1
γN˜
+
N∗
N˜
(ln ρ(f)− ln ρ(h)), (C.22)
lnµ(f) =
1
γN˜
+
N
N˜
(ln ρ(h)− ln ρ(f)), (C.23)
where the approximation lnµ ≈ µ− 1 was used.
Note that combining (C.21) with (C.22) and (C.23) the following expressions
for expenditure shares for Home and Foreign produced varieties respectively can be
obtained:
s(h) = γ(lnµ(h)), (C.24)
s(f) = γ(lnµ(f)). (C.25)
Subtracting (C.23) from (C.22) gives:
lnµ(h)− lnµ(f) = ln ρ(f)− ln ρ(h). (C.26)
On the other hand, from pricing equations (3.16)-(3.20) the ratio of Foreign to
Home varieties for Home consumer is:
ρ(f)
ρ(h)
=
µ(f)(w∗/z∗)(1 + τ)
µ(h)(w/z)
, (C.27)
or, using the notation TOL = w
∗/z∗
w/z
:
ρ(f)
ρ(h)
=
µ(f)
µ(h)
(1 + τ)TOL. (C.28)
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Substituting (C.26) back into (C.22)and (C.23) gives the following key result:
(
ρ(f)
ρ(h)
)2 = (1 + τ)TOL = (
µ(h)
µ(f)
)2, (C.29)
using which the markup equations can be rewritten as:
lnµ(h) =
1
γN˜
+
N∗
2N˜
ln(TOL(1 + τ)) (C.30)
lnµ(f) =
1
γN˜
− N
2N˜
ln(TOL(1 + τ)), (C.31)
and similarly for markups in Foreign:
lnµ(f)∗ =
1
γN˜
+
N
2N˜
ln
1 + τ
TOL
, (C.32)
lnµ(h)∗ =
1
γN˜
− N
∗
2N˜
ln
1 + τ
TOL
. (C.33)
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Appendix D
The Stylized Model in Log-linear Form
µ̂(h) =
1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂∗ (D.1)
µ̂(h)∗ =
1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂∗ (D.2)
µ̂(f)∗ = −1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂∗ (D.3)
µ̂(f)∗ = −1
4
T̂OL− 1
2
lnµ(h)ssN̂ − 1
2
lnµ(f)ssN̂∗ (D.4)
N̂ = (ψ − 1− β)ŵ − f̂ (D.5)
N̂∗ = (ψ − 1− β)ŵ∗ (D.6)
ψ(ŵ − ŵ∗)− (N̂ − N̂∗)− ̂− µ(f)ss
µ(f)ss − 1 µ̂
∗(h) +
µ(f)ss
µ(f)ss − 1 µ̂(f) = 0 (D.7)
ŵ((ψ − 1)(µ(h)ss − 1)
2
µ(h)ss
− (µ(f)ss − 1)
2
µ(f)ss
) + ŵ∗(ψ)
(µ(f)ss − 1)2
µ(f)ss
+
+̂
(µ(f)ss − 1)2
µ(f)ss
+ µ̂(h)(µ(h)ss − 1
µ(h)ss
) + µ̂(h)∗(µ(f)ss − 1
µ(f)ss
) =
f
Lγwψ−1ss
f̂(D.8)
ŵ∗((ψ − 1)(µ(h)ss − 1)
2
µ(h)ss
− (µ(f)ss − 1)
2
µ(f)ss
) + ŵ(ψ)
(µ(f)ss − 1)2
µ(f)ss
−
−̂(µ(f)ss − 1)
2
µ(f)ss
+ ̂µ(f)ss(µ(h)ss − 1
µ(f)
) + µ̂(h)∗(µ(f)ss − 1
µ(f)ss
) = 0 (D.9)
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Appendix E
The Benchmark CES Model
With CES preferences, the consumption, the price index is given by:
P = [
∫ N
0
p(h)1−σdh+
∫ N∗(1−φ)
0
p(f)1−σdf ]
1
1−σ (E.1)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and all markups are constant and equal to
σ
σ−1 . Consumption of Home and Foreign varieties is given by the following relations:
c(h) = ρ(h)−σC (E.2)
c(f) = ρ(f)−σC (E.3)
Substituting these expressions into the equation for profits yields:
d = (µ− 1)w
z
y (E.4)
which, combined with the free entry condition, gives the following equation for the
size of the firm:
y =
fz
µ− 1 (E.5)
Incorporating also the labor market clearing condition and the trade balance equation,
The system can be summarized by the following five equations in five endogenous
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variables: N,N∗, w, w∗, .
N = wψ−1−β
Lz
f
µ− 1
µ
(E.6)
N∗ = w∗ψ−1−β
L∗z∗
f ∗
µ− 1
µ
(E.7)
fz
µ− 1 = L(µ
w
z
)−σwψ + L∗(1− φ)(1 + τ)1−σ(µw
z
)−σw∗ψ (E.8)
f ∗z∗
µ− 1 = L
∗(µ
w∗
z∗
)−σw∗ψ + L(1− φ)(1 + τ)1−σ(µw
∗
z∗
)−σwψ (E.9)
N∗L(µ
w∗
z∗
)1−σwψ = NL∗(µ
w
z
)1−σw∗ψ (E.10)
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Appendix F
The Real Exchange Rate
The real exchange rate is the relative price of Foreign consumption in terms of Home
consumption.
lnQ = lnP ∗ + ln ε− lnP (F.1)
Using the translog expenditure function as defined above and the symmetry assump-
tion (in Home all Home produced varieties have the same price and all Foreign pro-
duced varieties have the same price) the Home price index can be rewritten as:
lnP =
N
N˜
ln p(h) +
N∗
N˜
ln p(f)− 1
2
γNN∗
N˜
(ln p(h)− ln p(f))2 (F.2)
And Foreign price index can be rewritten as:
lnP ∗ =
N∗
N˜∗
ln p∗(f) +
N
N˜∗
ln p∗(h)− 1
2
γNN∗
N˜∗
(ln p∗(f)− ln p∗(h))2 (F.3)
Note that:
N
N˜
ln p(h) +
N∗
N˜
ln p(f) =
N
N˜
(ln p(h)− ln p(f)) + ln p(f) (F.4)
And:
N∗
N˜∗
ln p∗(f) +
N
N˜∗
ln p∗(h) =
N∗
N˜∗
(ln p∗(f)− ln p∗(h)) + ln p∗(h). (F.5)
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Plugging these expressions into (3.66) yields:
lnQ = lnTOT +
N∗
N +N∗
(ln p∗(f)− ln p∗(h))− N
N +N∗
(ln p(h)− ln p(f))−
−1
2
γNN∗
N +N∗
((ln p∗(f)− ln p∗(h))2 − (ln p(h)− ln p(f))2), (F.6)
where lnTOT = ln p(h)∗ + ln ε − ln p(f) was used. Further, using the following
expressions for relative prices in Home and Foreign respectively:
ln p(h)− ln p(f) = −1
2
(lnTOL+ ln(1 + τ)), (F.7)
ln p∗(f)− ln p∗(h) = 1
2
(lnTOL− ln(1 + τ)), (F.8)
the real exchange rate can be written as:
lnQ = lnTOT +
1
2
lnTOL(1 +
γ ln(1 + τ)NN∗
N +N∗
) + ln(1 + τ)
N −N∗
2(N +N∗)
. (F.9)
In log-linear terms:
Qˆ = ˆTOL
ln(1 + τ)γN
4
+ (Nˆ − Nˆ∗) ln(1 + τ)
2
. (F.10)
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